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Note 
Centralizing Energy Consumption Data in a 
State Data Hub 
Zachariah Sibley* 
INTRODUCTION 
At least 78.9 million smart meters currently monitor the 
electricity usage of U.S. residents and businesses.1 Each of those 
meters can transmit a reading every fifteen minutes, logging 
over 35,000 data points on a single customer every year.2 Over 
time, these data points tell a story about each customer—a 
valuable one for those looking to optimize the electric grid and 
consumption behavior, but also at invasive one detailing 
customers’ private activities. The tension between smart meter 
data as optimizing information and smart meter data as an 
intrusive view into a home or business raises an important 
question: Who should manage all the electricity usage data 
collected by smart meters?3 
A satisfactory answer to this question becomes increasingly 
necessary as the store of energy usage data continues to grow 
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 1. See How Many Smart Meters are Installed in the United States, and 
Who has Them?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=108&t=3 (last updated Oct. 6, 2018). 
 2. Mani Vadari, Data Analytics Transforms Utilities, T&D WORLD (Nov. 
20, 2018), https://www.tdworld.com/smart-grid/data-analytics-transforms-
utilities (“Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) and smart meters are 
bringing in more than 35,000 data points per year based on 15-minute reading 
intervals per customer.”). 
 3. Data “management” in this context boils down to practices and policies 
that balance the benefits of broad access to energy usage data with the costs of 
data misappropriation and remedial measures to cure data breaches. 
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and as the scope of customers being smart-metered expands.4 In 
fact, the management of energy data is emerging as a core 
function of electricity markets.5 U.S. states predominantly place 
the data management burden on the electric utilities while 
regulating their practices and policies from the sidelines. That 
decentralized model underperforms, however, at getting the 
stories contained in smart meter data to the policymakers and 
energy entrepreneurs anxious to realize the social benefits of 
this data.6 
This Note argues that centralizing the management of 
energy consumption data into government data centers provides 
a more efficient and effective option. Namely, a central data hub, 
like those emerging in European countries,7 would better 
balance data disclosure and completeness with data privacy 
protection. Previous literature advocates the reduced burden on 
electric utilities to collect, aggregate, and release the data, the 
greater ability to police data disclosures and privacy practices, 
and the advantages of leveraging staff expertise to address 
                                                        
 4. See Herman K. Trabish, No Time to Think: How Utilities are Handling 
the Deluge of Grid Data, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 24, 2016), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/no-time-to-think-how-utilities-are-handling-
the-deluge-of-grid-data/425021/ (“As much information as utilities are facing 
today, it likely pales in comparison to the wave of data they will face as more 
customers add distributed generation, microgrids proliferate and demand-
management programs become more sophisticated.”); see also ADAM COOPER, 
INST. FOR ELEC. INNOVATION, ELECTRIC COMPANY SMART METER 
DEPLOYMENTS: FOUNDATION FOR A SMART GRID 1 (2017), 
http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iei/publications/Documents/IEI_Smart%20M
eter%20Report%202017_FINAL.pdf (projecting U.S. smart meter deployment 
to reach 90 million by 2020). 
 5. See MASS. INST. OF TECH. ENERGY INITIATIVE, UTILITY OF THE FUTURE 
199–200 (2016), http://energy.mit.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Utility-of-
the-Future-Full-Report.pdf (“[A] fourth core function [of electricity distribution 
systems] may become increasingly important: that of data platform or data 
hub.”). 
 6. See Jeff St. John, US Smart Meter Deployments to Hit 70M in 2016, 
90M in 2020, GREENTECH MEDIA (Oct. 26, 2016), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/us-smart-meter-deployments-
to-hit-70m-in-2016-90m-in-2020#gs.FLna=sQ (describing how California, 
Florida, Texas, and Illinois still lack customer data-sharing and applications 
despite expansive advanced metering infrastructure deployment). 
 7. See infra Part I.D.i. (discussing examples of European energy meter 
data hubs). 
2019] CENTRALIZING ENERGY CONSUMPTION DATA 317 
 
technical issues and provide independent research services.8 
Skeptics, on the other hand, argue that well-crafted regulations 
of utilities can achieve the same without the added bureaucracy 
of an energy data hub.9 This Note counters that misaligned 
incentives and moral hazards between private utilities and 
government regulators increase the social costs of the 
decentralized approach and justify any added bureaucratic costs 
of a centralized energy data hub. 
Part I recounts the history of energy metering, introduces 
how the transition to advanced meter infrastructure (AMI) 
revolutionized its potential, and describes the obstacles energy 
consumption data management must overcome to achieve that 
potential. Part I concludes with a survey of the European 
experience and the current energy usage data management 
practices in the United States.  
Part II analyzes the effects of centralizing energy 
consumption data management in a government meter data 
hub. A centralized, public data center would experience 
significantly less market power, agency, and coordination 
problems which detract from the effectiveness of the 
decentralized, private data management model. The data hub 
model would optimize energy data collection, disclosure, and 
protection.  
This Note concludes that the centralized smart meter data 
hub more than compensates for its added bureaucratic costs by 
correcting for moral hazards, better coordinating data collection 
and distribution, and implementing privacy protections more 
aligned with public expectations. The centralized, public agency 
approach warrants more serious discussion by U.S. states as 
they investigate the best data management structure for their 
growing store of energy consumption data. 
                                                        
 8. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Wilson, Remaking Energy: The 
Critical Role of Energy Consumption Data, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1095, 1150–57 
(2016). 
 9. See The Utility Reform Network, Comments on Assigned 
Commissioner’s Scoping Memo and Ruling Amending Scope of Proceeding to 
Seek Comments and to Schedule Workshops on Energy Data Center 3–5 (Cal. 
Pub. Util. Comm’n Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Efile/G000/M039/K596/39596153.PDF. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
This Part introduces AMI and the various governmental 
approaches to regulating it. Section A discusses the history of 
electricity metering and how the emergence of AMI is changing 
the traditional relationships between electric power industry 
players. Section B explores energy consumption data’s potential 
benefits for energy consumers, electric utilities, government 
policymakers, and energy efficiency service providers. Section C 
discusses the obstacles to achieving these benefits requiring 
regulatory intervention to overcome. Section D concludes with a 
survey of U.S. federal, state, and European approaches to energy 
consumption data management. 
A. HISTORY OF ENERGY USAGE DATA AND THE ADVENT OF 
ADVANCED METERING INFRASTRUCTURE 
The electricity meter reader is disappearing.10 In its place is 
a network of advanced meters wirelessly recording and 
transmitting consumers’ energy consumption data11 at a much 
greater frequency than monthly readings.12 These “smart” 
meters operate in an internet-of-things, supported by AMI, 
which includes “communicating thermostats and other in-home 
controls, . . . communication networks from the meters to local 
data concentrators, back-haul communications networks to 
corporate data centers, meter data management systems 
(MDMS) and, finally, data integration into existing and new 
                                                        
 10. See Eric Roper, Move Over Rotary Phones – Meter Readers Join Ranks 
of the Relics, STAR TRIBUNE (Oct. 1, 2016), http://www.startribune.com/once-
neighborhood-regulars-water-meter-readers-disappear-as-technology-
advances/394862321/. 
 11. As of 2017, nearly half of U.S. electricity customers had smart meters. 
See Alexander Mey & Sara Hoff, Nearly Half of All U.S. Electricity Customers 
Have Smart Meters, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34012. At least 78.9 million 
smart meters have been installed. See How Many Smart Meters are Installed in 
the United States, and Who has Them?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=108&t=3 (last updated Oct. 6, 2018). 
 12. See MAURICE R. GREENBERG, DIGITAL DECARBONIZATION: PROMOTING 
DIGITAL INNOVATIONS TO ADVANCE CLEAN ENERGY SYSTEMS 74 (Varun 
Sivaram ed., 2018), https://cfrd8-
files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Essay%20Collection_Sivaram_Digital
%20Decarbonization_FINAL_with%20cover_0.pdf (“Smart meters provide 
2,920 times more data points than monthly manual meter readings.”). 
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software application platforms.”13 This vast internet-of-things 
connects “the grid, consumers and their loads, and generation 
and storage resources.”14 
Meter readers of the past manually collected cumulative 
account-level data for billing purposes.15 AMI, on the other hand, 
automatically communicates significantly more detailed 
information—like the consumption of a particular appliance 
within the home—at more frequent time intervals. AMI turns 
real time activities in the physical world—flipping a light switch, 
starting a clothes dryer, or charging an electric vehicle—into 
meaningful data. These data points create a detailed narrative 
about one’s energy usage that can serve purposes far beyond 
billing for whoever has access to them. 
This transition elevated data from transactional “exhaust” 
into a valuable asset.16 As more software-equipped appliances 
integrate themselves into this energy internet-of-things, smart 
metering can break down their individual contributions to a 
building’s overall consumption on monthly, weekly, or even 
minute-by-minute intervals.17 Beyond describing the energy 
situation within the home or business, account-level data can 
also be aggregated to form a “building-level” or “community-
                                                        
 13. NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ADVANCED 
METERING INFRASTRUCTURE 5 (2008), 
https://www.smartgrid.gov/files/advanced_metering_infrastructure_02-
2008.pdf. 
 14. Id. at 2. 
 15. Account-level data refers to energy usage data from a single meter, 
which can also be considered one’s “energy usage personality.” Virginia Hewitt, 
So You Think You Can Aggregate Data: The Reality Show of Energy Usage, 
ACEEE BLOG (July 7, 2014, 2:00 PM), https://aceee.org/blog/2014/07/so-you-
think-you-can-aggregate-data-r; see also Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1103 
(detailing the history of manual energy usage data collection and the utilities’ 
need for smarter technology). 
 16. See BILL SCHMARZO & MOUWAFAC SIDAOUI, APPLYING ECONOMIC 
CONCEPTS TO BIG DATA TO DETERMINE THE FINANCIAL VALUE OF THE 
ORGANIZATION’S DATA AND ANALYTICS, AND UNDERSTANDING THE 
RAMIFICATIONS ON THE ORGANIZATIONS’ FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AND IT 
OPERATIONS AND BUSINESS STRATEGIES 1 (2017), https://infocus.emc.com/wp-
content/uploads/2017/04/USF_The_Economics_of_Data_and_Analytics-
Final3.pdf. 
 17. See Zhanyu Ma et al., The Role of Data Analysis in the Development of 
Intelligent Energy Networks, 31 IEEE NETWORK 88, 91 (2017) (suggesting 
between eight and thirty-minute intervals is optimal for “most analytical 
purposes”). 
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level” picture of energy usage.18 The next section outlines how 
sufficiently granular and aggregated energy usage data can be 
leveraged to benefit the consumer, the electric utility provider, 
governments, and third-party energy businesses. 
B. BENEFITS OF ENERGY USAGE DATA 
Electricity powers much of U.S. daily life and so reducing 
the costs to produce, transmit, and consume it will positively 
impact everyone on an electrical grid. AMI’s two-way flow of 
information enables energy consumers, power utilities, 
governments, and energy efficiency service providers to 
visualize, interact with, and optimize the flow of energy in ways 
not previously possible. This section details how these energy 
industry stakeholders can gain from continued investment in, 
and proper management of, energy data. 
1. Consumers—Better Informed Energy Consumption 
Decision-Making 
Energy consumers occupy three traditional categories: (1) 
residential; (2) commercial; and (3) industrial.19 These customer 
classes have different historical relationships with electricity 
usage data availability and application. Greater rollout of AMI 
will equalize access to energy information and enhance existing 
market opportunities for all customer classes as well as creates 
new energy product markets for consumers.20 
Energy consumers, particularly residential and small 
business customers, face steep informational asymmetries when 
making energy-related decisions.21 A consumer that only sees 
                                                        
 18. AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON., BEST PRACTICES FOR 
WORKING WITH UTILITIES TO IMPROVE ACCESS TO ENERGY USAGE DATA 1 
(2014), https://aceee.org/files/pdf/toolkit/utility-data-access.pdf. 
 19. See Electricity Customers, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
https://www.epa.gov/energy/electricity-customers (last updated Mar. 13, 2018). 
The transportation sectors’ use of electricity as fuel is nascent and is 
intertwined with residential end-users and commercial fleets, so the distinction 
is ignored in this Note. 
 20. See NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS, VALUE OF CUSTOMER 
DATA ACCESS: MARKET TRENDS, CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES 11 (2015), 
https://pubs.naruc.org/pub.cfm?id=536E2C7B-2354-D714-51CE-
F035BA50FAA1. 
 21. Electricity price signals are less intuitive or often difficult to discern for 
energy consumers, especially when compared to other energy resources they 
purchase, like gasoline. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1105, 1110. 
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the traditional monthly flat-rate bill receives no price signal that 
might inform his or her daily or hourly energy consumption 
habits. Since burning natural gas or coal, turning a wind 
turbine, or causing controlled nuclear reactions generate 
electricity at different costs,22 a kilowatt-hour of electricity 
produced with a higher-cost generator should cost more to the 
consumer. And since electric utilities sequence energy 
production so that the low-cost generators go online before the 
high-cost generator until it meets the current demand,23 
electricity should be low cost when demand is low—because only 
the low-cost generators are online—and more expensive during 
high-demand hours of the day. Smart metering allows electric 
utilities to match the true cost of a kilowatt-hour of electricity 
with the price reflected on the bill through a method known as 
time-variant pricing.24 These near-real-time price signals inform 
consumers on the real costs of their daily or hourly energy use 
and encourage them to either turn off an energy-intensive 
appliance or shift non-essential energy use off high-demand 
times to the lower-cost, low-demand times.25 
                                                        
 22. See generally, How Much Does It Cost to Generate Electricity with 
Different Types of Power Plants, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=19&t=3 (last updated Mar. 8, 2019) 
(linking to a table with historical data on average annual power plant operating 
expenses). 
 23. Dispatch stacking of generation facilities occurs at regional electricity 
wholesale markets, which are competitive energy clearinghouses with federal 
oversight. See DIV. OF ENERGY MKT. OVERSIGHT, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY 
COMM’N, ENERGY PRIMER 54–55 (2015), https://www.ferc.gov/market-
oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf. 
 24. Time-variant pricing includes: (1) time-of-use (TOU) pricing which 
varies prices at a set amount depending on the time of day consumption occurs; 
(2) real-time pricing (RTP) which varies prices on a frequent basis, such as 
hourly, that match the volatility of the actual cost of energy production; (3) 
critical peak pricing (CPP) which signals the customer that demand is reaching 
critical peak and prices will be increased above the flat rate; and (4) critical 
peak rebate (CPR) which pays the utility customer for each kWh removed from 
their normal load. See Beia Spiller, All Electricity Is Not Priced Equally: Time-
Variant Pricing 101, ENVTL. DEF. FUND’S ENERGY EXCHANGE BLOG (Jan. 27, 
2015), http://blogs.edf.org/energyexchange/2015/01/27/all-electricity-is-not-
priced-equally-time-variant-pricing-101/; see also William W. Hogan, Time-of-
Use Rates and Real-Time Prices (Aug. 23, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government at 
https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/fs/whogan/Hogan_TOU_RTP_Newark_082314.pd
f) (comparing the efficiency gains of TOU and RTP rates). 
 25. See Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart Meters, 86 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 161, 162 (2011). 
322 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 20 
 
These demand incentives make time-variant pricing an 
important tool in a larger effort known as demand-side 
management.26 Demand-side management encompasses two 
separate approaches. The first is demand response, in which 
electric utilities compensate consumers—typically large 
commercial or industrial customers—for reducing their energy 
consumption at peak demand intervals.27 Demand flexibility, on 
the other hand, seeks to shift consumption off of peak demand 
and onto low-demand intervals.28 These efforts help electric 
utilities avoid costly investments to upgrade generation, 
transmission, and distribution systems because they ensure that 
the number of kilowatt-hours consumers need during peak 
demand does not exceed the currently available capacity to 
generate and transport those kilowatt-hours.29 Customers 
benefit from avoided upgrade costs that would otherwise be 
passed on to their utility bills. 
In addition to being blind to the true cost of every kilowatt-
hour they consume, consumers are also out of tune with their 
energy consumption across individual appliances.30 Lack of 
knowledge about which energy-consuming activities are most 
costly or energy-intensive frustrates attempts at being more 
                                                        
 26. See Electric Utility Demand Side Management, U.S. ENERGY INFO. 
ADMIN., https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/dsm/ (defining DSM as the 
“planning, implementing, and monitoring activities of electric utilities which 
are designed to encourage consumers to modify their level and pattern of 
electricity usage.”); see also Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n v. Elec. Power 
Supply Ass’n, 136 S.Ct. 760 (2016) (upholding the Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission’s Order 745 promoting demand response programs in wholesale 
energy markets). 
 27. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1106–07. 
 28. See id. at 1107. 
 29. See David Ferris, Nest Best, Tesla Worst in a Suite of Tools that Could 
Save Utilities Billions, ENERGYWIRE (Aug. 27, 2015), 
http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2015/08/27/stories/1060023999 (citing a 
Rocky Mountain Institute report that demand flexibility “could reduce U.S. 
peak demand by about 8 percent and in the process save $9 billion a year in 
infrastructure upgrades to generation, transmission and distribution systems”). 
 30. There are also high transaction costs—in terms of time spent and risk 
of human error—for consumers to manually obtain their energy consumption 
information which could be reduced if smart meter data was meaningfully 
presented to him or her. See Phillip Henderson, Utilities Should Stop Driving 
with the Brakes On! Give Building Owners Information on Energy Use, NAT’L 
RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL: EXPERT BLOG (Sept. 28, 2015), 
https://www.nrdc.org/experts/philip-henderson/utilities-should-stop-driving-
brakes-give-building-owners-information. 
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energy efficient. It is hard to invest high upfront costs in an 
energy-efficient appliance without a real sense of whether the 
long-term energy usage reduction will result in actual financial 
savings.31 Consumers with access to the sufficiently granular 
energy usage data, however, can independently analyze their 
energy usage and work to “increase energy efficiency, produce 
their own energy, make better financial decisions, and create 
new energy business models.”32 If the energy usage data is 
presented effectively,33 it can significantly lower transaction 
costs associated with obtaining this consumption information 
and promote energy-efficient lifestyle changes.34 
For example, smart meter data could correct an 
informational blind spot for potential homebuyers.35 
                                                        
 31. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1106. 
 32. Id. at 1107–08; see also Simon Mouat, A New Paradigm for Utilities: 
The Rise of the Prosumer, SCHNEIDER ELECTRIC BLOG (Nov. 17, 2016), 
https://blog.schneider-electric.com/energy-management-energy-
efficiency/2016/11/17/new-paradigm-utilities-rise-prosumer/ (discussing how 
smart grid technologies such as AMI now allow for prosumers—retail energy 
customers also capable of energy generation which they can sell back to the 
grid—as well as more customer control over consumption). 
 33. See PAOLO BERTOLDI ET AL., EUROPEAN COMM’N JOINT RESEARCH CTR., 
CONSUMER FEEDBACK SYSTEMS: HOW MUCH ENERGY SAVINGS WILL THEY 
DELIVER AND FOR HOW LONG? 12-9 (2016), 
https://aceee.org/files/proceedings/2016/data/papers/12_769.pdf (listing 
features of feedback that reduce energy consumption); see also Brian Bowen, 
How Utilities Can Meet Millennials’ Needs in a Data-Sharing Economy, 
GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/how-utilities-can-meet-
millennials-needs-in-a-data-sharing-economy#gs.kDdvbt2Z. 
 34. One way to lower transaction costs is to improve energy-efficiency 
providers’ ability to access energy usage data and target customers with specific 
products and services tailored to their energy needs, bringing energy efficiency 
to consumers instead of consumers having to expend resources finding them on 
their own. See Denis Du Bois, How Efficiency Is Learning About Market 
Segmentation from Internet Giants and Political Campaigns, GREENTECH 
MEDIA (Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/how-
energy-efficiency-marketers-are-learning-about-market-segmentation-
from#gs.gRyMNIU. 
 35. Energy efficiency affects a home’s valuation and so transparency about 
the home’s actual energy profile will better match the ultimate price with the 
indirect and future financial impacts the home’s energy efficiency. See ERDAL 
AYDIN, DIRK BROUNEN & NILS KOK, INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY: EVIDENCE FROM THE HOUSING MARKET 22–23 (2018), 
https://sustainable-finance.nl/upload/researches/Aydin-Et-Al-Information-
Asymmetry.pdf; Danielle Winner, Data Access Rules: Energy Bill Disclosure in 
the Rental and Housing Markets 5 (Apr. 26, 2015) (unpublished Masters of 
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Homebuying is a major financial decision, and the law respects 
that fact by obligating disclosures about a home that may affect 
its value.36 Those disclosure rules, however, generally do not 
include the home’s energy usage profile. The seller’s cost to 
manually create the energy profile made such a disclosure 
impractical, but now the digital record produced by smart 
metering significantly reduces that cost. Given the importance 
of a home’s monthly electric utility costs in assessing mortgage 
affordability37 and this reduced cost, a minority of states and 
cities have embraced the concept of a “home MPG” that “reflects 
a home’s expected energy use and carbon emissions, and allows 
comparison between area homes.”38 The real estate example 
illustrates how smart metering can correct information 
deficiencies in markets where complete information is critical to 
optimal financial decisionmaking.39 These smart meter enabled 
opportunities “represent necessary, if not sufficient, conditions 
for customer involvement in power management.”40 
2. Electric Utilities—Programs to Increase Demand, Avoid 
Infrastructure Costs, and Trim Operational Costs 
Enabling demand-side management with smart meter data 
not only benefits consumers, but also assists electric utilities in 
avoiding costly investments to upgrade generation, 
transmission, and distribution systems.41 Utilities traditionally 
structured rates and future investments by assuming a steadily-
                                                        
Public Policy Professional Paper, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University 
of Minnesota), https://conservancy.umn.edu/handle/11299/172486. 
 36. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1102–1102.14, 2079–2079.10 (2018). 
 37. See Scott Cooney, Tell Freddie & Fannie to Include Home Efficiency in 
Buyer Disclosures, CLEANTECHNICA (Mar. 10, 2016), 
http://cleantechnica.com/2016/03/10/freddie-fannie-fhfa-home-efficiency-buyer-
disclosures. 
 38. Home MPG: Energy Performance Scores, MASS.GOV, 
https://www.mass.gov/service-details/home-mpg-energy-performance-scores 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2019); see also Minneapolis, Minn., Code of Ordinances §§ 
47.190(e), 248.75 (2019); JACOB CORVIDAE & RACHEL GOLD, ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
INST., AN MPG FOR HOMES (2017), https://www.rmi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/RMI_An-MPG-for-Homes_Report_2017-1.pdf. 
 39. See AYDIN, BROUNEN & KOK, supra note 35 (citing K. Gillingham et al., 
Energy Efficiency Economics and Policy, 1 ANNUAL REV. OF RES. ECONS. 597 
(2009)) (“[I]nformation asymmetry between seller and buyer is generally 
accepted as one of the main reasons leading to underinvestment in energy 
efficiency in the housing market.”). 
 40. GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 46. 
 41. See Ferris, supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
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increasing demand for electricity, but more energy-efficient 
lifestyles and appliances along with new behind-the-meter 
generation alternatives like wind, solar, and storage disrupted 
that assumption to the detriment of utilities and their 
customers.42 The less frequent need for infrastructure upgrades 
means that energy utilities will not be spending capital on which 
they earn a set, competitive rate of return. The deployment of 
AMI, however, requires utility capital investment in the range 
of about $17 to $24 billion annually through 2030.43 These 
investments would revitalize, to an extent, that traditional rate 
of return on larger grid infrastructure investments.44 
Two-way communication through AMI also allows utilities 
to affect peak-hour demand to avoid stressing current grid 
capacity and incurring the social costs of power outages.45 
                                                        
 42. Stagnant demand is particularly harmful for electric utilities who must 
raise rates to cover static fixed costs even when these disruptive forces reduce 
the total number of kWhs they must deliver. See Leonard S. Hyman & William 
Tilles, The Sun Will Set on Electric Utilities, BARRON’S (July 9, 2016), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-sun-will-set-on-electric-utilities-
1468041067 (describing a “utility death spiral”—”[u]tilities raise prices, making 
an easier entry for competitive products, then utilities lose sales and must raise 
prices more to pay for all of the overhead they installed unnecessarily, and 
competitors take still more of the market”—if utilities fail to craft more flexible 
rate designs). But see JÜRGEN WEISS ET AL., THE BRATTLE GRP., 
ELECTRIFICATION: EMERGING OPPORTUNITIES FOR UTILITY GROWTH (2017), 
http://files.brattle.com/system/publications/pdfs/000/005/396/original/electrific
ation_-_emerging_opportunities_for_utility_growth.pdf?1485268804 
(explaining that the utility death spiral is likely an overstatement considering 
upcoming investment opportunities to increase electricity demand). 
 43. See STEVE BOSSART & RYAN EGIDI, NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., 
MATERIALS RESEARCH FOR SMART GRID APPLICATIONS 5 (2012), 
http://ceramics.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/mcare12-smart-grid-apps.pdf. 
 44. See Mike O’Boyle, Three Ways Electric Utilities Can Avoid a Death 
Spiral, FORBES (Sept. 25, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2017/09/25/three-ways-electric-
utilities-can-avoid-a-death-spiral/2/#7bb779b4713e. 
 45. See Mary Miller & Ruth Littmann-Ashkenazi, Beyond Smart Meters: 
Pushing the Envelope of Demand Response, ELECTRIC ENERGY ONLINE (March 
2010), https://electricenergyonline.com/show_article.php?mag=62&article=480 
(suggesting that an annual $150 billion cost could be reduced by the demand 
management potential of smart meters); see also Kayoung Kim et al., 
Estimation of the Inconvenience Cost of a Rolling Blackout in the Residential 
Sector: The Case Of South Korea, 76 ENERGY POL’Y 76 (2015) (measuring the 
social cost attributable to rolling blackouts, defined as “the intentional outage 
of electricity during peak demand periods . . . to maintain the balance between 
supply and demand”); The Large Costs of Even the Smallest Power 
Outages . . . and Tools to Prevent Them, NRG INSIGHTS (Nov. 10, 2017), 
https://www.nrg.com/insights/energy-education/the-large-costs-of-even-the-
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Utilities can create tariffs and programs that compensate 
consumers for the right to turn off certain energy-intensive 
items to reduce overall demand.46 AMI-connected electric water 
heaters or air conditioners could be remotely cycled off by the 
utility.47 Tariffs could establish time-of-day and duration 
parameters for these remote interruptions.48 With enough 
customer participation, short shutoffs of select customer 
appliances could achieve significant demand reduction,49 
avoiding the inconvenience of a full rolling blackout. Direct 
demand control would also help utilities prolong the life of 
existing transmission and distribution infrastructure. 
Demand-side management also presents an opportunity for 
utilities to coordinate the introduction of new loads—and 
maximize profits from the higher electricity demand—while 
avoiding costly infrastructure updates. For example, increased 
transportation electrification presents a new, energy-intensive 
load.50 Electric cars and buses would significantly increase 
                                                        
smallest-power-outages-and-tools-to-prevent-them.html (stating one tool to 
reduce the $27 billion annual cost of power outages in key sectors is utility 
demand response). 
 46. See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., DEMAND RESPONSE—UTILITY 
COMMANDED LOAD CONTROL, IECSA Vol. 2 at D12-2, 
http://smartgrid.epri.com/UseCases/DemandResponse-
UtilityCommandedLoadControl.pdf. 
 47. For example, the Wisconsin Public Service Commission offers a “Cool 
Credits” program that lets customers “earn credits on [their] electric bills for 
allowing [their] air conditioning and/or electric water heater to be occasionally 
shut down for short periods.” Cool Credits Direct Load Control Program, WIS. 
PUB. SERV., https://accel.wisconsinpublicservice.com/home/cool_credits.aspx 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2019); see also Nicole Casal Moore, How Air Conditioners 
Could Advance a Renewable Power Grid, THE U. REC. (Feb. 8, 2019), 
https://record.umich.edu/articles/how-air-conditioners-could-advance-
renewable-power-grid (“More strategic control of air conditioners could improve 
the overall efficiency and reliability of the power grid and make it easier to 
transition to renewable energy.”). 
 48. See id. (explaining the time-of-day and duration parameters of the Cool 
Credits program). 
 49. See Robert Walton, Duke, Austin Energy, PG&E Among Demand 
Response Award Recipients from PLMA, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 21, 2016), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/duke-austin-energy-pge-among-demand-
response-award-recipients-from-plma/417841/ (describing Duke Energy 
Florida’s EnergyWise Home Program that has more than 400,000 participants 
and allows it to directly manage 653 MW). 
 50. See Gavin Bade, CEC: California EV Chargers Will Add 1 GW of Peak 
Demand by 2025, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 20, 2018), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/cec-california-ev-chargers-will-add-1-gw-of-
peak-demand-by-2025/519517/ (reporting on a California Energy Commission 
2019] CENTRALIZING ENERGY CONSUMPTION DATA 327 
 
demand and subsequent profits from electricity sales. Those 
profits are maximized if, through demand flexibility incentives, 
consumers shift electric vehicle charging to off-peak times so 
that this demand is captured when the grid is underutilized. 
This approach increases electricity sales and simultaneously 
avoids expenditures on infrastructure upgrades. Energy usage 
data is critical to electric vehicle loads particularly because of 
their unique load profile which researchers label the “Dragon 
Curve.”51 Without sufficient usage data and analysis on 
increasing electric vehicle loads, researchers fear electric 
utilities “may be caught unprepared” and instead of maximizing 
profits of a new load, these unprepared electric utilities will be 
expending costs on new grid infrastructure and recovering those 
costs through increased rates.52 
Utilities could follow the example of Southern Company, 
National Grid, and Xcel Energy which invested in utility-focused 
energy data analytics companies like AutoGrid.53 The electric 
utilities will be able to compete in these energy services markets, 
with $20 billion already anticipated to be spent on consumer 
data analytics throughout the United States by 2021.54 These 
investments signal that major electric utilities are interested in 
optimizing the power industry and possibly providing their 
customers targeted energy-efficiency services. This new utility-
customer relationship would open an additional revenue source 
in the face of stagnant or declining demand for electricity. 
Finally, smart meters allow utilities to trim operational 
costs.55 Analog tasks like meter reading and on-demand meter 
connections become automated. Quicker, remote, and customer-
                                                        
report that states there will be 1 GW of residential and nonresidential electric 
vehicle charging added to peak electricity demand throughout the California 
electricity grid by 2025). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See Robert Walton, Utilities Ill-Prepared for EV Demand, SEPA Finds, 
UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/time-not-on-
their-side-utilities-ill-prepared-for-ev-demand-sepa-finds/519530/. 
 53. See Katie Fehrenbacher, There’s Big Money in Energy Big Data, 
FORTUNE (May 24, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/24/big-money-in-energy-
big-data/. 
 54. See Olivia Chen, US Utilities to Spend $20 Billion on Customer 
Analytics Through 2021, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/us-utilities-to-spend-20-billion-
on-customer-analytics#gs.0dENHKs. 
 55. See NAT’L ASS’N OF REGULATORY UTIL. COMM’RS, supra note 20, at 12–
13. 
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specific service reduces the costs of correcting billing errors, 
using paper mail to send and collect bills, or communicating 
issues and repair times which can increase customer 
satisfaction.56 The remote monitoring of the meters and their 
data also allows for utilities to better respond to meter 
tampering and to more accurately evaluate their demand-side 
management programs.57 Overall, utilities stand to gain from 
reduced operational and infrastructure costs by more 
dynamically working with customer loads and needs—a 
possibility only with AMI’s real-time information about 
customer energy consumption and two-way communication 
capabilities. 
3. Governments—Benchmarking and Improved Policy 
Crafting 
The benefits of AMI and energy usage data are not exclusive 
to the utility-consumer relationship. Third parties can also 
capitalize on the information-rich energy usage data supplied by 
smart meters. One major third party in the power industry is 
government. State and local policymakers need energy usage 
data to support and enforce ordinances and mandates focused on 
consumption reduction or improved energy efficiency.58 Energy 
usage data also allows state agencies “to verify compliance with 
conservation, energy efficiency, and emission reduction efforts” 
as well as benchmark progress toward legislative goals.59 
Governments can additionally take proactive steps by targeting 
energy-efficiency interventions at particularly high-demand 
energy consumers, saving taxpayer dollars on implementation 
costs.60 
Energy usage data also empowers environmental interest 
groups to be better informed civilian monitors of public officials 
                                                        
 56. See id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1108; Joe Hall, Bob Cattanach & 
Brad Hammer, So, Who Owns Your Energy-Use Data?, WINDPOWER ENG’G & 
DEV. (Oct. 23, 2015), 
https://www.windpowerengineering.com/environmental/so-who-owns-your-
energy-use-data/. 
 59. Hall, Cattanach & Hammer, supra note 58; see also Klass & Wilson, 
supra note 8, at 1108. 
 60. See Matteo Jarre et al., Energy Consumption Data as a Decision-
Making Tool for Energy Efficient Interventions in PA: The Case-study of Turin, 
111 ENERGY PROCEDIA 1050 (2017). 
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and agencies. Whether government resources are scarce or its 
priorities have shifted away from energy consumption programs, 
energy data allows independent analysis by public interest 
organizations to evaluate government efforts and effectiveness 
in achieving the conservation, efficiency, or emission reduction 
goals of legislation.61 For government actors and those concerned 
citizens monitoring their governance, energy usage data allows 
for “better program implementation, accountability, and 
evaluation.”62 
4. Third-Party Businesses—Energy Efficiency Service 
Providers and Data Analytics 
A major hurdle that prevents wider adoption of energy-
efficient technology and practices is the high price to acquire the 
information necessary to make an individual business case for 
such an investment.63 In the same way energy data better 
informs individual consumers, entrepreneurs can leverage 
economies of scale to interpret and make the business case for 
entire categories of consumers. A 2016 estimate suggests that 
the market for companies researching and designing new 
energy-related products and services will be worth $1.3 billion, 
in addition to a $3.3 billion market for targeted marketing by the 
product and service providers.64 While utilities will likely begin 
to see the market opportunity to provide these energy-efficiency 
services themselves, non-utility providers should also have an 
opportunity to compete. 
Energy-efficiency services use energy data to identify 
energy consumers who will profit most from a new energy 
technology or an investment in more efficient electric appliances. 
Companies like Opower and FirstFuel, for example, collect 
energy usage data from utility companies, combine it with other 
third-party data about consumers and evaluate the energy use 
                                                        
 61. See Hall, Cattanach & Hammer, supra note 58. 
 62. Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1108. 
 63. See Alan H. Sanstad & Richard B. Howarth, ‘Normal’ Markets, Market 
Imperfections and Energy Efficiency, 22 ENERGY POL’Y 811, 814–16 (1994) 
(citing imperfect information, informational asymmetry, high transaction costs 
in correcting those information market failures, imperfections in capital 
markets, and the bounded rationality tied to energy decisions as the top major 
obstacles to optimal adoption of energy efficiency). 
 64. Jim Mazurek, The Data Treasure Chest: Is There a Market to Sell Utility 
Data?, ACCENTURE BLOG (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.accenture.com/us-
en/blogs/blogs-utility-data-treasure-chest-there-market-sell-utility-data. 
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and improved efficiency opportunities of different segments of a 
given population.65 Utilities like the Tennessee Valley Authority 
work with large industrial customers to comply with greenhouse 
gas accounting standards and provide them with more accurate 
information for emission reporting requirements.66 Other, more 
unique third parties like meteorological organizations might 
also offer energy-efficiency services by adjusting a homeowner’s 
thermostat to match the day’s weather conditions.67 Price and 
marketing competition in new energy-efficiency markets will 
continue to improve these services as more energy data becomes 
accessible to utility and non-utility providers alike.68 
C. BARRIERS TO OPTIMAL SMART METER DATA USAGE 
Energy usage data can only achieve its upside if it is 
accessible, complete, and confidential. Access is hindered when 
private data holders, like the electric utility, face higher 
transaction costs to make the data available than they could 
recover in infrastructure savings or profit-making opportunities. 
Left to economic incentives alone, private sector data holders 
will undersupply access and fail to realize the potential of an 
“open data” approach.69 Completeness of data diminishes when 
there is a lack of participation in smart metering, a lack of 
coordination between the separate utilities, or a lack of AMI-
connected items. Finally, overreactions to privacy risks may 
distort views on where the appropriate level of protection lies—
leading to overinvestment in privacy protections which drives up 
                                                        
 65. See Justin Worland, Your Utility Company Wants to Sell You More than 
Just Electricity, TIME (June 3, 2016), http://time.com/4312285/utility-company-
electricity-solar-power/; see also Du Bois, supra note 34 (discussing the 
underuse of market segmentation and target marketing in the energy-efficiency 
markets). 
 66. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1102. 
 67. See MICHAEL MURRAY & JIM HAWLEY, GOT DATA? THE VALUE OF 
ENERGY DATA ACCESS TO CONSUMERS 10 (2016). 
 68. See Katherine Tweed, Texas Has Millions of Smart Meters. So Why 
Haven’t Third-Party Energy Services Blossomed?, GREENTECH MEDIA (Oct. 14, 
2016), https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/texas-highlights-the-
challenge-of-one-click-energy-services (detailing the technological bottlenecks 
that prevent non-utility service providers from accessing enough energy 
customer data to successfully provide their services). 
 69. ABRAMS ENVTL. LAW CLINIC, UNIV. OF CHI. LAW SCH., FREEING 
ENERGY DATA (2016), 
https://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/file/freeing_energy_data_report_abrams_en
vironmental_clinic_june_2016.pdf. 
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transaction costs, entry barriers to energy markets, and missed 
opportunity costs. 
1. Accessibility 
“The inability of customers and third parties to access this 
data—be it daily, hourly, or near-real time—significantly limits 
the benefits that smart meters can provide.”70 Access is first 
measured by who can access energy usage data and presentation 
quality. There is general agreement that customers should have 
access to their data.71 The utility responsible for billing 
customers also requires access to calculate account-level usage. 
But when it comes to third parties—researchers, government 
agencies, and energy service providers—access can be difficult to 
come by.72 The questions are which third parties should enjoy 
access to account-level and aggregated data and how should 
access be limited. Third-party access varies among the states,73 
but current “legal ambiguities” in regulations and a patchwork 
of policies hinder optimal access for many.74 Non-disclosure 
requirements also keep smart meter data access concentrated in 
a select few 
Accessible also means convenient and intuitive displays. 
This feature weighs heavily as an obstacle for residential and 
small business customers.75 Without the sophisticated data 
analytic capabilities of utilities or larger businesses, raw data is 
                                                        
 70. Coley Girouard, Electricity in the Information Age: Big Data Could 
Mean Big Benefits for All, ADVANCED ENERGY PERSP. (Dec. 1, 2016, 4:39 PM), 
https://blog.aee.net/electricity-in-the-information-age-big-data-could-mean-big-
benefits-for-all. 
 71. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1118 (“When states have 
considered customers’ access to their own data, nearly all have decided that 
customers should have access.”); see also TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.107(b) (2018). 
 72. See GREENBERG, supra note 12, at 11 (“[E]lectric power utilities often 
require researchers to sign nondisclosure agreements to access and analyze 
electricity consumption data from smart meters.”). 
 73. See infra Section D for a discussion of state approaches to energy data 
management. 
 74. ABRAMS ENVTL. LAW CLINIC, supra note 69, at 1 (“[L]egal ambiguities—
along with concerns of consumer privacy advocates and utilities—appear to 
have discouraged utilities from releasing the data to [energy efficiency service 
providers].”). 
 75. See generally Press Release, J.D. Power, Utilities Lag Other Industries 
in Digital Experience, but Standouts are Emerging, J.D. Power Finds (Mar. 21, 
2018), http://www.jdpower.com/press-releases/jd-power-2018-utility-digital-
experience-study (acknowledging that consumers are accustomed to user-
friendly digital interfaces in many aspects of life). 
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useless or misleading to them.76 Rather, online web portals 
capable of presenting basic analytical breakdowns of a 
customer’s energy usage should be adopted. Unfortunately, J.D. 
Power recently found that “[u]tilities are among the lowest-
performing industry groups when it comes to delivering distinct 
digital customer experiences.”77 The solution is the intuitive 
display of “usage, account information and payment 
information, in a streamlined format” delivered via desktop or 
mobile devices.78 
Convenient, user-friendly energy data applications also 
increase customer willingness to authorize third party access 
where necessary. Multi-step online authorization processes and 
even single-page paper authorization forms can present a 
cumbersome obstacle to a third party receiving customer-
controlled authorization.79 One- or two-step processes, click-
through functionality, and digital signatures provide the 
necessary convenience and intuitiveness to encourage increased 
third party access agreements.80 
2.  Completeness 
The first aspect of completeness is representativeness, both 
in terms of which players participate and in terms of which 
                                                        
 76. See Yogi Schulz, Big Data Is Useless without Visual Analytics, IT 
WORLD CAN. (Oct. 5, 2016), https://www.itworldcanada.com/blog/big-data-is-
useless-without-visual-analytics/386943; Brian Solis, Without Analytics, Big 
Data Is Just Noise, BRIAN SOLIS (Apr. 24, 2013), 
https://www.briansolis.com/2013/04/without-analytics-big-data-is-just-noise/ 
(describing the misleading and uninformative nature of digital data without 
sufficient analytical processes to interpret it). 
 77. Press Release, J.D. Power, supra note 75 (“When benchmarked against 
other consumer-facing industries, utilities deliver the worst digital 
experiences . . . . [T]he utility industry scores 571 on a 1,000-point scale. The 
retail sector, by contrast, scores 771.”). 
 78. Id. (finding these features bumped digital customer satisfaction up by 
43 points). 
 79. See ROBERT KING & ROB BEVILL, S.-CENT. P’SHIP FOR ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY AS A RES., IMPROVING ACCESS TO SMART METER DATA IN TEXAS 8–
13 (Oct. 2016), https://eepartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Meter-
Data-Access-Report-FINAL.pdf (comparing in part the effects of cumbersome 
authorization and consumer-side information requirements on smart meter 
data access in Texas). 
 80. See ADVANCED ENERGY ECON., ACCESS TO DATA: BRINGING THE 
ELECTRICITY GRID INTO THE INFORMATION AGE 9 (Sept. 2017), 
https://info.aee.net/hubfs/PDF/Access-to-data.pdf (proposing consumer-
conscious measures to increase access to energy data). 
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appliances are connected. An internet-of-things often fails in 
practice because the relevant stakeholders fail to develop a 
“partner ecosystem.”81 In the power industry, that means 
regulators and utilities of all types—investor-owned, municipal, 
and cooperatives—need to coordinate intrastate data 
management efforts.82 Coordination and cooperation, however, 
are not favored business strategies for utility monopolies 
protective of service territories,83 nor for energy municipalities 
or power cooperatives looking to avoid state regulator 
interference in their affairs. 
One manifestation of coordination would be 
standardization. Standardization is “critical” to achieving the 
energy policy benefits promised by energy usage data.84 Sharing 
energy usage data between a state’s utilities, and then between 
states, requires the same application programming interface or 
interoperability between separate systems.85 For third parties, 
the additional cost of translating data from multiple utilities 
with inconsistent formats into a compatible format on top of 
access costs may dissuade many from dealing with certain 
utilities and leave portions of a state underserved. 
The second aspect of completeness is maximizing the 
number of devices connected through an internet-of-things. Only 
with the insights provided by appliance-level data can the above-
                                                        
 81. Maciej Kranz, Success with the Internet of Things Requires More Than 
Chasing the Cool Factor, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 7, 2017), 
https://hbr.org/2017/08/success-with-the-internet-of-things-requires-more-
than-chasing-the-cool-factor. 
 82. Ideally completeness requires interstate collaboration, but in the 
absence of federal action that is not an imminent reality. 
 83. For example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission had to order 
public utilities to stop discriminatory transmission practices in energy 
wholesale markets. Non-Discriminatory Open Access Transmission Tariff, 18 
C.F.R. § 35.28 (2018); cf. Marius Buchmann, The Coordination Problem: A Key 
Challenge for Smart Grids, THE ENERGY COLLECTIVE GROUP (June 26, 2017), 
http://www.theenergycollective.com/enerquire/2407459/coordination-problem-
key-challenge-smart-grids. 
 84. Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1152. 
 85. See MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., THE INTERNET OF THINGS: MAPPING THE 
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described benefits be achieved.86 Completeness requires major 
appliances, electric transportation, solar panels, and residential 
battery units to be communicating with one another. This 
transition needs targeted investments for customers to replace 
standard electric appliances with two-way connected ones.87 
Completeness requires more energy consuming items to become 
smart.88 
3. Privacy Security 
There are four major factors that drive privacy concerns in 
big data: (1) the incremental effect; (2) automated decision-
making; (3) predictive analysis; and (4) lack of access and 
exclusion.89 Privacy fears enlarge because existing legal 
frameworks often get outpaced by big data collection, 
aggregation, and analysis, leaving these adverse effects 
unchecked.90 As energy data becomes more granular, it reveals 
more about the data subject’s energy usage, even to the point of 
personally identifying a specific person or business—a benefit 
                                                        
 86. See, e.g., Coley Girouard, Advanced Metering: Making the Most of 
Connectivity for a Modern Grid, ADVANCED ENERGY PERSP. (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://blog.aee.net/advanced-metering-making-the-most-of-connectivity-for-a-
modern-grid (“[Highly granular] data are essential building blocks for 
customized load management programs and other services that can empower 
customers to effectively and simply control their energy usage and costs . . . [as 
wel as] improve system-wide efficiency by enabling utilities to develop more 
precise real-time load monitoring and forecasting capabilities.”). 
 87. See, e.g., Adam B. Jaffe, Richard G. Newell & Robert N. Stavins, 
Economics of Energy Efficiency, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENERGY 83–84 (Cutler 
Cleveland ed., 2004) (explaining that adoption of new energy-efficiency products 
is hindered by incomplete information, principal-agent problems, lack of 
incentive to internalize environmental externalities, and inabilities to privately 
incentivize the development of energy-efficient technologies with high positive 
externalities for the environment but low profits for sellers). 
 88. See Amena Ali, Four Ways to Unlock the Full Potential of the IoT 
Connected Home, IOT AGENDA (Jan. 24, 2017), 
http://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/blog/IoT-Agenda/Four-ways-to-
unlock-the-full-potential-of-the-IoT-connected-home (“The path to this future 
requires data—big data—on each appliance and home to observe and analyze 
appliance and home energy consumption patterns, trends and anomalies.”). 
 89. Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, Big Data for All: Privacy and User 
Control in the Age of Analytics, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 239, 251–56 
(2013). 
 90. Cf., e.g., M. James Daley, Information Age Catch 22: The Challenge of 
Technology to Cross-Border Disclosure & Data Privacy, 12 SEDONA CONF. J. 
121, 122 (2011) (“Law and public policy, which exist to help bring order out of 
chaos, simply cannot keep pace.”). 
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for targeted marketing but potentially invasive if it falls into 
nefarious hands.91 
Consumers fear personally identifying energy consumption 
data may alert potential thieves to when their home is 
unoccupied.92 Another major concern is that smart meter data 
will lead to violations of Fourth Amendment rights—namely 
police using energy usage data to detect potentially criminal 
operations or zoning violations.93 Finally, neighbors, friends, or 
political opponents could monitor sensitive personal information 
traditionally protected by a building’s four walls.94 
The consumer privacy concerns create hesitation and delay 
on the part of energy utilities and public utility regulators. For 
utilities, the lack of industry practice for data disclosures, the 
looming costs of regulatory hurdles, and the regular security 
maintenance costs for protecting customer usage data all delay 
utility executives from diligently exploring this new 
opportunity.95 Moreover, regulators fear being “caught with 
their pants down” by authorizing a data practice that leads to a 
privacy breach.96 The fear of public backlash and criticism may 
                                                        
 91. See 2 NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
GUIDELINES FOR SMART GRID CYBERSECURITY 9–12 (2014), 
https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2014/NIST.IR.7628r1.pdf. 
 92. See ISHTIAQ ROUF ET AL., ACM CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER AND 
COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY, NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH: SECURITY AND PRIVACY 
ANALYSIS OF AUTOMATIC METER READING SYSTEMS 462, 468 (2012) (“[I]t is 
feasible to identify sensitive information of the residents, such as whether the 
residents are at home.”). 
 93. See, e.g., Natasha H. Duarte, The Home Out of Context: The Post-Riley 
Fourth Amendment and Law Enforcement Collection of Smart Meter Data, 93 
N.C. L. REV. 1140, 1156–60 (2015) (discussing jurisprudence on the Third Party 
Doctrine failing to protect smart meter data and the personal information it 
reveals about one’s home); Sonia K. McNeil, Privacy and the Modern Grid, 25 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 199, 205 (2011) (“The information can be used to identify 
marijuana ‘grow houses,’ sweat shops, or brothels, or to detect violations of 
housing ordinances or zoning regulations.”). 
 94. See McNeil, supra note 93, at 205 (“Anyone with access to smart meter 
data can deduce the ‘avocations, finances, occupation, general reputation, 
credit, health, or any other personal characteristics of the customer or the 
customer’s household.’”). 
 95. See ABRAMS ENVTL. LAW CLINIC, supra note 69, at 15–22. 
 96. Jeff St. John, New Report Highlights the Costs of Ongoing Utility-
Customer Data Divide, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 4, 2016), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/new-report-highlights-the-
costs-of-ongoing-utility-customer-data-divide#gs.HbR80=I. 
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be why privacy standards currently being adopted tend to be 
overly restrictive.97 
While important, privacy concerns can be overstated in the 
energy usage data context.98 Costly privacy protections and 
methods should be matched with different categories of energy 
usage data, each with their own benefits and sensitivity. 
Professors Klass and Wilson categorized energy usage data by 
its level of granularity and its associated time lag.99 The 
different characteristics warrant separate privacy treatments; 
at one end is mandatory customer consent, extensive 
aggregation techniques, and strong anti-breach infrastructure, 
and at the other is no consent requirement, minimal 
aggregation, and lax requirements on the data-receiver’s 
facilities.100 The merits of different aggregation methods are 
beyond the scope of this Note, except to note that policymakers 
should tier privacy requirements to match the actual privacy 
risks associated with different categories of energy usage data. 
D. APPROACHES TO ENERGY METER DATA MANAGEMENT 
The central question of this Note is who should be 
responsible for meter data management—the distribution 
system operators (DSOs), the retail electric providers (REPs), a 
private third party, or a government agency.101 Data 
                                                        
 97. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1153 (“Most, if not all, data-seeking 
parties agree that the current 15/15 standard is overly restrictive, but no clear 
successor has yet emerged.”). For a discussion on the 15/15 rule, see infra note 
145 and accompanying text. 
 98. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1158. 
 99. Id. at 1156–57 (categorizing energy usage data into three separate 
categories: (1) real-time, subhourly data (high sensitivity); (2) semigranular 
hourly or monthly historic data (moderate sensitivity); and (3) nongranular 
annual historic energy use data (low sensitivity)). 
 100. See id. 
 101. A utility company might be a DSO or a REP or both depending on 
whether it is located in a traditionally regulated or deregulated state. In 
traditionally-regulated state electricity markets, a single utility company 
operates a closely-regulated monopoly over the generation, distribution, and 
retail sales of electricity making it both the DSO and REP. See Regulated vs. 
Deregulated Electricity Markets, ENERGYWATCH (Jan. 9, 2018), 
https://energywatch-inc.com/regulated-vs-deregulated-electricity-markets/ 
(“From the generation to the meter, the utility has complete control.”). 
Deregulated, or restructured, electricity markets unbundle at least retail sales 
which requires DSOs (the incumbent utilities with ownership over the 
electricity distribution lines and wires) to compete with individual REPs for 
customers. See id. For a more thorough explanation see Seth Blumsack, 
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management responsibilities can also be spread across these 
parties. A 2016 survey from the Council of European Energy 
Regulators observed three general meter data management 
approaches: 
A fully centralised model . . . would be a data hub, where all data is 
retrieved, validated, stored, protected, processed, distributed and 
accessed. This model is essentially a ‘one stop shop’ for data, where 
DSOs, market actors and all consumers only have one actor, the data 
hub, which they relate to. 
A partially centralised model involves centralisation of one of the key 
aspects of data management, typically distribution and access to 
data . . . [like] a communications hub that provides a common access 
point for data that could be stored in several databases, at DSOs or at 
metering points i.e. the model could enable centralized access to data 
stored at decentralised locations . . . . 
A decentralised model would typically mean that all the key aspects 
of data management are . . . the responsibility of the DSO. A typical 
decentralized model would be a standardised message exchange 
system or another more crude way of connecting market actors with 
DSOs, such as the use of PDF-files for updated network tariffs. This 
does not typically include a common access point, but rather a 
standardised or non-standardised format through which market 
actors can communicate with DSOs and request the data they require. 
The customer does not typically have access to data in a decentralised 
model, but will have to contact the DSO for access to data.102 
 
Numerous European and U.S. examples illustrate these 
three approaches and how they function in practice. 
1. The European Experience 
The data management structures in the Netherlands, 
Norway, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, and Great Britain offer a 
brief but informative introduction to the array of potential 
centralization options: 
                                                        
Electricity Industry Structure and Regulation, E-EDUC. INST., https://www.e-
education.psu.edu/eme801/node/529 (last visited Jan. 17, 2019). 
 102. COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN ENERGY REGULATORS, REVIEW OF CURRENT 
AND FUTURE DATA MANAGEMENT MODELS 13 (2016), 
https://www.ceer.eu/documents/104400/-/-/1fbc8e21-2502-c6c8-7017-
a6df5652d20b; see also Atrias and MIG6.0: Towards a New Energy Market 
Model in Belgium, SIA PARTNERS (Jan. 7, 2016), http://energy.sia-
partners.com/20160701/atrias-and-mig60-towards-new-energy-market-model-
belgium (distinguishing between the decentralized, point-to-point approach, the 
“centralized approach through externalization of services,” and the DSO-centric 
data gathering approach with a centralized common service). 
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Netherlands. In 2007, the Energie Data Services Nederland 
(EDSN) centralized Dutch energy meter data.103 EDSN 
standardized data formatting for grid operators, which led to 
innovations in Dutch laws and regulations to better allow the 
application of smart meter data to benefit consumers, and, 
through its Project Meetcampagne, create energy consumption 
profiles to optimize underlying systems.104 
Norway. Prior to AMI rollout in Norway, it used a 
decentralized, DSO-centered approach with a standardized 
communication portal to exchange meter data.105 Even with a 
uniform communication format, the decentralized approach still 
resulted in “complex business processes, as market participants 
have to speak with each individual DSO to gain access to 
data.”106 To minimize these transaction costs, Norway 
transitioned to Elhub—a centralized meter data storage, 
protection, and distribution hub.107 
Italy. Italy uses a decentralized, DSO-centric approach but 
lacks communication uniformity.108 With Italian DSOs using 
over 350 different standards in their own management systems, 
the Italian energy industry faced a “major communications issue 
. . . between distributors and suppliers, and . . . a total lack of 
                                                        
 103. See ENERGIE DATA SERVICES NEDERLAND (EDSN), 
https://www.edsn.nl/english/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019). 
 104. See Onze Projecten, ENERGIE DATA SERVICES NEDERLAND (EDSN), 
https://www.edsn.nl/onze-projecten/ (last visited Jan. 18, 2019); see also FILIP 
CHRISTIANSEN & MATILDA TRANELL, DATA MANAGEMENT AND BUSINESS 
OPPORTUNITIES IN EMERGING SMART METERING MARKETS 29–30 (2016), 
http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1094807/FULLTEXT01.pdf (“As of 
2016, EDSN is mainly working as a portal where all external parties, such as 
suppliers and third parties, can request and retrieve data. The standardization 
of the hub has reached a high level, allowing efficient distribution of data 
irrelevant of which DSO that is collecting and submitting the meter data to the 
hub.”). 
 105. COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN ENERGY REGULATORS, supra note 102, at 21. 
 106. Id. 
 107. ELHUB, https://elhub.no/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2019) (stating that Elhub 
went operational February 18, 2019). See generally El Hub, The Norwegian 
Datahub for the Electricity Market—ELHUB (English main), YOUTUBE (Mar. 
11, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uYVo1MHBFvc. 
 108. COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN ENERGY REGULATORS, supra note 102, at 21 
(“The DSO is responsible for meter readings and technical activities, collecting 
and storing metering data, meter data validation and making them available 
for market participants on a non-discriminatory basis . . . . DSOs and suppliers 
have to keep to the Privacy Code and other rules on privacy.”). 
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completeness in [its] consumer identification data.”109 To correct 
these issues, Italy mandated the creation of the Sistema 
Informativo Integrato (SII) that centralized the sharing, 
integration, and exchange of energy meter data.110 The Italian 
government already uses the SII to prevent rampant evasion of 
a TV tax and recognizes significant public policy and commercial 
uses of SII’s centralized format.111 
Denmark. This electricity market is uniquely REP-centric 
and uses its DataHub as a central market platform that 
functions as the country’s centralized data storage and exchange 
medium as well as the central market processer.112 The DSOs 
report all metering values to the DataHub which then 
distributes it to “authorised market actors, end customers and 
relevant third parties.”113 The REPs control “how to visualise 
consumption data to their consumers” within certain minimum 
requirements.114 Retail customers “fully control how and when 
energy advisors, service providers and other third parties can 
get access to their consumption data.”115 DataHub facilitated 
significant improvements in the Danish electricity markets.116 
                                                        
 109. Alessio Borriello, The Italian Energy Data Platform, in 6TH EUROPEAN 
ENERGY FORUM 13 (2017), http://www.wec-
france.org/DocumentsPDF/rapports/Actes-2017.pdf. 
 110. See Legge 13 agosto 2010, n. 129, in G.U. Aug. 18, 2010, n.192 (It.); see 
also COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN ENERGY REGULATORS, supra note 102, at 23 (“[SII] 
will become a central hub for customer consumption data, although some 
processes such as activation, deactivation and meter reading will still be carried 
out by DSOs.”). 
 111. Borriello, supra note 109, at 13–14. 
 112. See COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN ENERGY REGULATORS, supra note 102, at 
21–22; see also What Is the Purpose of DataHub?, ENERGINET, 
https://en.energinet.dk/Electricity/DataHub#Documents (last visited Jan. 17, 
2019) (“Every piece of information about the electricity consumption of Danish 
consumers is stored in DataHub, which also handles business processes, such 
as change of address, change of supplier etc.”). 
 113. COUNCIL OF EUROPEAN ENERGY REGULATORS, supra note 102, at 22. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. See id. (“Settlement of small consumers based on hourly values will be 
implemented gradually from 2017 to 2020, which will increase the incentives 
for end-users to actively take part in the market. The current DataHub ensures 
a level playing field for all suppliers through standardised processes for 
registration and distribution of market data, low entry barriers for new market 
participants, one point of entry for change of supplier and a clear definition of 
DSO and suppliers and separation of roles.”). 
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Belgium. The DSOs in Belgium collectively founded Atrias 
to function as both a central clearing house for the Belgian 
energy market as well as a central meter data manager.117 Like 
the Danish, the approach would still observe a decentralized 
meter data collection and storage but would centralize 
distribution and access in the Atrias data hub.118 High costs 
have led to delays which worry Belgian energy officials about the 
future of the project.119 
Great Britain. Finally, Britain activated its centralized 
smart network, the Data and Communications Company (DCC), 
in 2016.120 DCC is a private entity licensed and regulated by the 
U.K. government.121 In addition to facilitating energy market 
processes, DCC will fully centralize smart meter data retrieval, 
storage, and accessibility as Great Britain develops its AMI 
network.122 
2. U.S. Federal Energy Consumption Data Management 
The federal government regulates a limited number of 
energy usage data creation and dissemination issues. Two 
programs—the Environmental Protection Agency’s ENERGY 
STAR Portfolio Manager and the electric industry’s Green 
                                                        
 117. See id. (“The CMS is financed by all Belgian DSOs to take up the 
market data facilitation role and will be operated by a company called Atrias.”). 
 118. See Atrias and MIG6.0: Towards a New Energy Market Model in 
Belgium, supra note 102. (“The individual DGOs will still hold the detailed 
metering data and communicate the necessary data to the data hub (Atrias) 
who will be responsible for the access register. This approach lowers the barrier 
for new third party market players to request information from the DGO to be 
able to provide their services.”). 
 119. See Pieterjan Van Leemputten, IT-Databank Belgische Energiesector 
Opnieuw Uitgesteld: Tommelein Pleit Voor Vlaamse Databank, DATANEWS 
(Dec. 13, 2018), https://datanews.knack.be/ict/nieuws/it-databank-belgische-
energiesector-opnieuw-uitgesteld-tommelein-pleit-voor-vlaamse-
databank/article-normal-1406145.html?cookie_check=1547770208. 
 120. See Building Britain’s Smart Economy, DATA COMM. COMPANY (Aug. 
28, 2018), https://www.smartdcc.co.uk/news-and-insights/industry-
insights/building-britain-s-smart-economy/. 
 121. See Transition to Smart Meters, OFGEM, 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/gas/retail-market/metering/transition-smart-meters 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2019). 
 122. See DATA COMMC’NS CO., BUILDING BRITAIN’S SMART FUTURE (2018), 
https://www.smartdcc.co.uk/media/1954/smart_dcc_business_plan_2018-
19__1_.pdf. 
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Button initiative—encompass the entirety of federal influence 
on the structure of energy data management.123 
Portfolio Manager scores and certifies commercial buildings’ 
energy efficiency by “analyzing a building’s . . . type, available 
space, and energy consumption by fuel type.”124 Top scoring 
buildings receive ENERGY STAR certification.125 Participating 
building owners can compare their performance with similar 
buildings and national medians.126 Portfolio Manager succeeded 
in “increasing building owners’ awareness of energy efficiency 
opportunities, incentivizing energy efficiency projects by 
enabling comparisons to similar types of buildings or national 
medians, and providing a consistent framework for publishing 
energy efficiency data.”127 The fact that it relies on voluntary 
disclosures, however, creates a self-selecting dataset—“high-
performing buildings are likely more willing to share their 
data.”128 
A presidential challenge to increase the uniformity of and 
access to energy consumption data for customers prompted the 
electric industry’s “Green Button” platform development.129 
Green Button records data in an XML format and features data 
exchange protocols that allow automatic energy data transfers 
between utilities and third parties.130 Green Button permits 
utilities to provide data in intervals ranging from fifteen 
minutes to month-by-month consumption.131 The Download My 
Data feature permits customers to directly download their data 
to personal devices, where the file can then be uploaded to third-
party applications.132 The Connect My Data feature allows 
                                                        
 123. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, 1112–13 (identifying the ENERGY 
STAR Portfolio Manager and Green Button programs as the primary vehicles 
for federal influence on the structure of energy data management). 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. 
 126. See id. 
 127. Id. at 1113. 
 128. Id. at 1113–14. 
 129. See What Is Green Button?, ENERGY.GOV, 
https://www.energy.gov/data/green-button (last visited Feb. 6, 2019); see also 
Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1114–15. 
 130. See What Is Green Button?, supra note 129. Green Button follows the 
Energy Services Provider Interface standard published by the North American 
Energy Standards Board. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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customers to authorize the secure transfer of their energy usage 
data directly to third parties.133 
Both Portfolio Manager and Green Button suffer, however, 
because of their voluntary nature. In addition to these voluntary 
programs, two federal agencies also published non-binding 
discussions on best energy data privacy practices: (1) the 
Voluntary Code of Conduct (VCC) published by the U.S. 
Department of Energy;134 and (2) the Guidelines for Smart Grid 
Cybersecurity (“Grid Guidelines”) published by the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology.135 Both the VCC and 
Grid Guidelines only recommend practices and standards.136 
This leaves the door open for state and local policymakers to 
supply the regulatory oversight and incentives to optimize 
energy meter data management. 
U.S. federal management of energy meter data is minimal, 
leaving states to fill this regulatory void in a “laboratories of 
democracy” fashion.137 As relative leaders in smart meter roll 
out and regulation, California, Illinois, and Texas provide 
examples of the contemporary state approaches to energy 
consumption data management.138 While starting with the 
                                                        
 133. Id. 
 134. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, VOLUNTARY CODE OF CONDUCT: FINAL 
CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES (2015), 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/01/f19/VCC%20Concepts%20and
%20Principles%202015_01_08%20FINAL.pdf. 
 135. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra note 91. The VCC and Grid 
Guidelines provide important discussions on privacy measures and expert 
analysis on aggregation techniques to protect energy consumers but are beyond 
the scope of this Note’s focus on the organizational choices for energy usage data 
management. 
 136. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 134, at 1 (“The VCC’s 
recommendations are intended to apply as high level principles of conduct for 
both utilities and third parties.”); NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., supra 
note 91 (describing its report as “an analytical framework that organizations 
can use to develop effective cybersecurity strategies . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 137. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system 
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”); cf. Sharon B. Jacobs, The Energy Prosumer, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 
572 (2017) (encouraging regulatory experimentalism in energy policy, 
particularly in regards to “complex and rapidly developing technology”). 
 138. See Coley Girouard, The State of Advanced Metering Infrastructure and 
Time-Varying Rates, in Three Maps and One Graph, ADVANCED ENERGY 
PERSPECTIVES (Nov. 22, 2017), https://blog.aee.net/the-state-of-advanced-
metering-infrastructure-and-time-varying-rates-in-three-maps-and-one-
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decentralized management structures, these states have begun 
initial steps toward centralizing particular meter data 
management responsibilities. 
3. California 
California moved from a fully competitive retail market to a 
partially restructured energy regulatory scheme following the 
California Energy Crisis between 2000 and 2001.139 There 
remains some semblance of retail electric choice, with thirty to 
forty percent of customers in the state’s investor-owned utilities’ 
service area receiving service from an alternative source or 
provider.140 The majority of retail energy consumers, however, 
are served by California’s six investor-owned utilities.141 
California currently ranks first on the Grid Modernization 
Index,142 with over 12.5 million AMI units deployed.143 
Consumer privacy received early attention. For 
consumption data, the California Public Utilities Commission 
(CPUC) readopted a data aggregation privacy practice known as 
                                                        
graph.-the-leaders-and-laggards-may-surprise-you (comparing the percentage 
of AMI meters installed out of total residential meters by state, and the active 
AMI dockets). 
 139. See CARL BLUMSTEIN, LEE S. FRIEDMAN & RICHARD GREEN, THE 
HISTORY OF ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN CALIFORNIA 21–28 (Aug. 2002), 
https://cloudfront.escholarship.org/dist/prd/content/qt85k8w3k7/qt85k8w3k7.p
df. 
 140. See The Future of Retail Electric Choice in California, DIRECT ENERGY 
BUS. BLOG (May 18, 2017), 
https://business.directenergy.com/blog/2017/May/future-retail-electric-choice-
california (“By the end of 2017, 30–40 percent of California’s investor-owned 
electric utility customers will be receiving some type of electricity service from 
an alternative source and/or provider, such as community choice aggregators, 
rooftop solar or direct access providers.”). 
 141. CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, CONSUMER AND RETAIL CHOICE, THE ROLE 
OF THE UTILITY, AND AN EVOLVING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 3 (May 2017), 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/uploadedfiles/cpuc_public_website/content/news_room/
news_and_updates/retail%20choice%20white%20paper%205%208%2017.pdf 
(estimating seventy-five percent of the retail load by the end of 2017 will be 
handled by investor-owned utilities, but that by the mid-2020s eighty percent 
of the retail load will instead come from “rooftop solar, Community Choice 
Aggregators (CCAs) and Direct Access providers (ESPs)”). 
 142. See GRIDWISE ALL., FOURTH GRID MODERNIZATION INDEX 10 (Nov. 
2017). 
 143. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER SALES, REVENUE, 
AND ENERGY EFFICIENCY FORM EIA-861 DATA FILES (2016), 
https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/eia861/ (open 2017 ZIP file on web page and 
select the “Advanced_Meters_2017” Microsoft Excel spreadsheet for data). 
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the “15/15 Rule” in 1997.144 The rule requires that database 
disclosures should be aggregated using at least fifteen 
customers, none of whom can make up more than fifteen percent 
of the total aggregated load.145 Commercial, agricultural, and 
industrial customer energy usage data must conform to the 
15/15 Rule.146 For residential customers, 100 or more account-
level data points must be aggregated.147 
In September 2012, the CPUC published a brief on its vision 
of a smart meter data hub.148 Recognizing the value of 
aggregated, granular smart meter data, the brief focused on 
correcting three access issues: (1) utility companies not readily 
available, unresponsive, or release out-of-scope, overly-
aggregated, and outdated usage data; (2) utility companies 
purposely exploiting these limitations for personal gain; and (3) 
utility companies interpreting state law and CPUC rules 
differently.149 The briefing paper ultimately sought ways to 
eliminate “the utility as the gate-keeper” to provide for greater 
government and researcher access to energy usage data.150 It 
recommended a public smart meter data hub which the authors 
believed might “provide greater availability, geographically and 
temporally, of aggregated and anonymized customer energy 
usage data in the long run, thereby lowering potential utility 
barriers to this data.”151 
                                                        
 144. See Proposed Policies Governing Restructuring Cal.’s Elec. Servs. 
Indus. & Reforming Regulation, 76 CPUC 2d 29 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n Oct. 9, 
1997). 
 145. Id. (“The 15/15 rule is that the . . . information should be made up of at 
least 15 customers, and a customer’s load must be less than 15% of an 
aggregation category.”). 
 146. See Order Instituting Rulemaking to Consider Smart Grid Techs. 
Pursuant to Fed. Legislation & on the Comm’n’s Own Motion to Actively Guide 
Policy in Cal.’s Dev. of a Smart Grid Sys., 313 PUB. UTIL. REP. 4th 167 (May 1, 
2014). 
 147. Id. 
 148. See generally AUDREY LEE & MARZIA ZAFAR, CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, 




 149. Id. at 1–2. 
 150. Id. at 2. 
 151. Id. 
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The authors viewed three possible roles for the smart meter 
data hub.152 First, it would be a data aggregator and 
anonymizer, making the usage data available and accessible 
without running afoul of privacy protection.153 Second, the smart 
meter data hub could provide independent research and analysis 
for state, CPUC, and utility programs using account-level data, 
but would then publish results in an “aggregated and 
anonymized form.”154 Third, the smart meter data hub would 
facilitate the safe transfer of account-level data to governmental 
organizations.155 These functions, in the CPUC’s view, would 
overcome the identified problems with the utility as data 
manager approach and streamline timely access to both account-
level and aggregated and anonymized usage data.156 
Ultimately, the CPUC chose to continue with the utility-
centric model, creating rules on different “use cases.”157 These 
use cases provide access privileges for local governments, 
researchers, and the public depending on the sensitivity of the 
data and the intentions of the requestor.158 The investor-owned 
utilities continue to manage energy usage data, aggregating the 
data and fulfilling access requests.159 The CPUC, however, 
suggested that it remains open to revisiting the idea in future 
proceedings.160 
4. Illinois 
Illinois restructured to a competitive retail market with the 
Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law of 1997.161 
The Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC) has regulatory 
                                                        
 152. Id. at 2–3. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 3. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 4. 
 157. Re Smart Grid Technologies, 313 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 167 (Cal. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n May 16, 2014). 
 158. Id. 
 159. See id. at *91–93 (ordering California’s investor-owned utilities 
regarding data management practices and activities). 
 160. Re Smart Grid Technologies, supra note 157, at *16. (“[T]he 
Commission continues to see the importance of exploring the value of a 
dedicated energy data center in the future to increase access to data while 
developing reasonable protections on customer privacy.”). 
 161. See generally Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law, 5 
ILL. COMP. STAT., art. XVI (1997). 
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oversight and is charged with promoting a competitive retail 
electricity market.162 Commonwealth Edison (“ComEd”) and 
Ameren Illinois (“Ameren”) operate service territories covering 
about ninety-eight percent of Illinois’ retail customers and all of 
the competitive retail electric suppliers.163 The Illinois 
legislature and the ICC required Ameren and ComEd to invest 
in AMI deployment,164 however both utilities offer customer opt-
out options for a fee.165 Illinois is currently second on the Grid 
Modernization Index,166 and is expected to have five million 
smart meters fully installed by 2019.167 
In 2014, Illinois’ Citizens Utility Board—the state’s 
ratepayer advocacy organization—and the Environmental 
Defense Fund petitioned the ICC to review, refine, and adopt 
their proposed Illinois Open Data Access Framework.168 The 
framework would govern access standards that detail rules for 
customers, utilities, and third parties to access customer usage 
data. As part of the discussions instigated by this ICC 
proceeding, Ameren and ComEd prepared “Data Roadmaps” 
that include plans for implementing data access standards.169 
                                                        
 162. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT., art. XVI, § 16-101A(d) (2018). 
 163. See ILL. COMPETITIVE ENERGY ASS’N, ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 
RESTRUCTURING IN ILLINOIS AT THE 10-YEAR MARK 3–4 (2017). 
 164. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT., art XVI, § 16-108.6(c) (2018). 
 165. ComEd filed a monthly $21.53 AMI refusal fee with the ICC. Re 
Commonwealth Edison Company: Submission of Rider NAM, Non AMI 
Metering, Docket No. 13-0552 at 13 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n Feb. 5, 2014), 
https://www.icc.illinois.gov/docket/files.aspx?no=13-0552&docId=209011 
(“Staff’s proposed $21.53 is reasonable, cost-based, and likely to deter meter 
refusals.”); see also Wade v. Ill. Commerce Comm’n, 91 N.E.3d 383, 385 ¶ 20 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2017) (concluding ComEd’s $21.53 refusal charge is 
reasonable, within the legislative prerogative, and is Illinois law under the filed 
rate doctrine). Ameren filed a $20 monthly tariff for AMI refusals. See Tony 
Reid, ‘Smart Meter’ Refusal Comes at a Cost, HERALD & REV. (Sept. 22, 2014), 
https://herald-review.com/news/local/smart-meter-refusal-comes-at-a-
cost/article_dbf05964-ecbf-5b8a-8347-4aaa4f4c9dc9.html (discussing Ameren’s 
$20 monthly fee). 
 166. See GRIDWISE ALL., supra note 142, at 10. 
 167. See MURRAY & HAWLEY, supra note 67, at 19. 
 168. See Citizens Utility Board and Environmental Defense Fund, Petition 
to Initiate a Proceeding to Adopt the Illinois Open Data Access Framework, 
Docket No. 14-0507 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n Aug. 15, 2014), 
https://www.icc.illinois.gov/docket/files.aspx?no=14-0507&docId=217753. 
 169. See Ameren Ill. Co., Direct Testimony Exhibit 1.1: Ameren Illinois 
Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) Data Road Map, Docket No. 14-0507 
(Ill. Commerce Comm’n June 5, 2017), 
https://www.icc.illinois.gov/docket/files.aspx?no=14-0507&docId=253801; see 
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The Open Data Access Framework covers recommendations 
on ownership, customer and third-party access, format, method 
of delivery, timeliness, security, and charges for provision of 
energy usage data.170 The Framework would make energy 
customers the principal owners of their energy usage data, 
meaning they have free access to data in fifteen-minute to one-
hour intervals.171 Third-party access to all energy data—
account-level and aggregated—is subject to affirmative 
customer authorization which is revocable at the customer’s 
discretion and subject to re-authorization requirements after a 
set number of months.172 It is on the customer to limit the scope 
of access to third parties, but in no event can be more strict than 
the 15/15 Rule.173 
The transmission utilities, under this framework, act as 
“guardian” by internally protecting and then disseminating the 
usage data to authorized parties.174 The utilities may create 
their own third-party approval processes for data security and 
transmission purposes.175 The utility would use “industry-
standard secure communications and encryption protocols” and 
similar industry-standard cyber security protections for internal 
data storage.176 Delivery of data should be timely—as near to 
real time as practicable—and done via the smart meter, over the 
internet through a “Web Portal” and a mobile application, and 
through bulk transfers where practicable.177 
Ameren’s Roadmap reveals that it completed several 
milestones in its deployment of AMI. Besides the physical 
installation and connection, it has integrated its smart metering 
with its billing systems and the Green Button Web Portal, made 
the system capable of remote connections, and began supplying 
                                                        
also Commonwealth Edison Co., Direct Testimony Exhibit 1.1: ComEd AMI 
External Data Exchanges, Docket No. 14-0507 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n June 5, 
2017), https://www.icc.illinois.gov/docket/files.aspx?no=14-
0507&docId=253787. 
 170. See generally CITIZENS UTIL. BD. & ENVTL. DEF. FUND, OPEN DATA 
ACCESS FRAMEWORK (2014), https://www.smartgridlegalnews.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/517/Illinois_Open_Data_Access_Framework_0814.pdf. 
 171. Id. at 1. 
 172. Id. at 1–2. 
 173. Id. at 2. 
 174. Id. at 1. 
 175. Id. at 2. 
 176. Id. at 7. 
 177. Id. at 6. 
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retail electric suppliers with “non-billing interval data.”178 
Residential customers with smart meters can receive daily or 
even hourly energy usage data on the web along with their 
monthly billing data.179 For commercial and industrial 
customers, usage data is collected in fifteen-minute intervals.180 
As of 2016, customers with home area networks “could receive 
‘near real time’ data.”181 Energy data is delivered to customers 
on the meter or online via Green Button’s “MyAccount portal” 
and, as of 2017, to third parties via Green Button’s “Connect My 
Data” function.182 All authorized access, regardless of whether 
by customers or third parties, is provided free of charge.183 
Ameren promises to provide aggregated, anonymous data 
subject to the 15/15 Rule for the whole service territory in the 
near future.184 
ComEd’s Roadmap tells a similar narrative. It is currently 
capable of offering raw usage data in near real time, partially 
validated usage data in thirty-minute intervals by the next day, 
hour-interval billed consumption data also within twenty-four 
hours, and aggregated anonymous usage data—conforming to 
the 15/15 Rule—at thirty minute or shorter intervals similarly 
by the next day.185 These data offerings can be delivered to 
customers through in-home devices, via Green Button’s Connect 
My Data function, and on ComEd’s website.186 Authorized third 
parties can receive the energy data through the same formats on 
Green Button, or can undergo ComEd’s anonymous usage data 
registration process to access this new data service.187 
                                                        
 178. Ameren Ill. Co., supra note 169, at 3. 
 179. Id. at 7. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. at 8–11. 
 183. Id. at 13. 
 184. Id. at 11. 
 185. Commonwealth Edison Co., supra note 169, at 7. 
 186. Id. at 8. 
 187. Id. at 10; see also Press Release, Commonwealth Edison Co., ComEd 
Launches New, Industry-Leading Energy Data Product (Feb. 13, 2017), 
https://www.comed.com/News/Pages/NewsReleases/2017_02_13.aspx; 
Anonymous Data Service, COMED, 
https://www.comed.com/SmartEnergy/InnovationTechnology/Pages/Anonymou
sDataService.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2019) (providing a description of 
ComEd’s anonymous data delivery services, instructions on how to access, and 
service agreement registration forms). 
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The ICC concluded that the “Open Data Access Framework 
provides beneficial considerations for data collection, security, 
management and means by which customers and third parties 
can access AMI data,” and that “the Data Roadmaps of Ameren 
and ComEd represent sound and appropriate plans to develop 
various systems and services around AMI data for customers 
and third parties.”188 Under this regulatory environment, 
Ameren and ComEd have successfully leveraged smart 
metering. ComEd offers a Peak Time Savings program, a 
demand flexibility initiative that credits residential customers’ 
monthly bills for delaying their “dishwasher, vacuum, clothes 
dryer, or other large electronics/appliances” use during peak 
demand hours.189 The program has resulted in $1.2 million in 
bill credits to 166,383 customers since it started in 2015.190 In 
August 2016, Ameren’s demand flexibility program, Peak Time 
Rewards,191 curtailed 30,100 kWhs.192 Despite legislative 
support and successful programs, there is still pushback from 
Illinois residents.193 
5. Texas 
Following the passage of Senate Bill 7 in 1999 and its 
implementation in 2002, Texas restructured its retail electricity 
                                                        
 188. Order, The Citizens Utility Board and The Environmental Defense 
Fund; Proceeding to Adopt the Illinois Open Data Access Framework, Docket 
No. 14-0507 at 6 (Ill. Commerce Comm’n July 26, 2017), 
https://www.icc.illinois.gov/docket/files.aspx?no=14-0507&docId=255196. 
 189. Peak Time Savings, COMED, 
https://www.comed.com/WaysToSave/ForYourHome/Pages/PeakTimeSavings.a
spx (last visited Jan. 31, 2019). 
 190. See David J. Unger, After Five Years, Illinois Smart Grid Buildout 
Showing Results, MIDWEST ENERGY NEWS (Apr. 27, 2017), 
http://midwestenergynews.com/2017/04/27/after-five-years-illinois-smart-grid-
buildout-showing-results/. 
 191. Peak Time Rewards, AMEREN ILL., https://peaktimerewards.com/ (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2019). 
 192. See Unger, supra note 190. 
 193. See Naperville Smart Meter Awareness v. City of Naperville, 114 F. 
Supp. 3d 606 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (dismissing all claims and denying, with prejudice, 
a non-profit corporations motion to file a third amended complaint in opposition 
to a city’s AMI deployment based on Fourth Amendment claim and on a claim 
for unreasonable search or an invasion of privacy in violation of Illinois’ 
Constitution); see also Karen Kidd, Belleville Resident Calls Ameren’s Smart-
Meter Plan a Bad Idea, METRO EAST SUN (Jan. 15, 2018), 
https://metroeastsun.com/stories/511278652-belleville-resident-calls-ameren-s-
smart-meter-plan-a-bad-idea. 
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market to allow competition between retail electric providers.194 
The incumbent investor-owned utilities still maintain a 
regulated monopoly service territory over transmission and 
distribution to avoid inefficient overlap of multiple private power 
lines.195 Since the incumbent transmission and distribution 
utilities also continue providing metering services,196 AMI and 
energy usage data decisions go through the Public Utility 
Commission of Texas (PUCT).197 In 2007, the PUCT accelerated 
smart meter deployment by allowing these transmission and 
distribution utilities to recover AMI installation costs from the 
rate base.198 By 2016, Texas utilities deployed over 9.3 million 
AMI devices.199 
PUCT supported AMI deployment with a series of 
technology requirements and policy goals for the transmission 
and distribution utilities managing customer energy usage data. 
The AMI must be capable of providing convenient, secure, and 
real-time access to customers, as well as providing data in 
fifteen-minute intervals and available by the next day to retail 
electric providers.200 Access includes the capability to deliver 
data on devices within the premises like a load control device or 
home area network.201 Standards and protocols must be open to 
the public and conform with industry standards.202 The state 
                                                        
 194. See S.B. 7, 76th Leg., ch. 405, § 39 (Tex. 1999); see also TEX. UTIL. CODE 
§ 39.001 et seq. (2018). 
 195. See JAKE DYER, CITIES AGGREGATION POWER PROJECT, INC., 10 YEARS 
OF SENATE BILL 7: THE HISTORY OF ELECTRIC DEREGULATION IN TEXAS 13 
(2009), http://tcaptx.com/downloads/HISTORY-OF-DEREGULATION.pdf 
(“The companies that own, operate and manage the transmission and 
distribution system remained regulated.”). 
 196. See TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.107(a) (2018) (“[M]etering services . . . shall 
continue to be provided by the transmission and distribution utility . . . that was 
serving the area before the introduction of customer choice.”). 
 197. See generally TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.000 (2018). 
 198. See 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.130(k) (2018); see generally Order 
Adopting New § 25.130 and Amendments to §§ 25.121, 25.123, 25.311, and 
25.346, Project No. 31418 (Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. May 10, 2007), 
https://www.puc.texas.gov/agency/rulesnlaws/subrules/electric/25.121/31418ad
t.pdf. 
 199. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 143. 
 200. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.130(g)(1)(E) (2018); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 
25.130(j)(1) (2018). 
 201. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.130(g)(1)(J) (2018). 
 202. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.130(g)(1)(I)–(J) (2018); 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE 
§ 25.130(j)(3) (2018). 
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legislature assigned “ownership” to the customer,203 and the 
PUCT recognizes this ownership by allowing customers to 
authorize energy usage data disclosures to any entity.204 
Five of Texas’ investor-owned electric transmission and 
distribution utilities responded in 2007 by collaborating on a 
centralized energy usage data portal called Smart Meter 
Texas.205 This common web portal allows customers, retail 
electric providers, and authorized third parties to access energy 
usage data. Consumers can request “Daily Energy Data (15-
minute intervals) and Daily Meter Read reports for up to 24 
months of historical energy data.”206 Consumer monthly usage 
can be requested for up to two years of historical usage data.207 
Consumers with home area networks can view real-time energy 
data.208 
As part of their “ownership” rights, electricity customers can 
allow third parties to access their account-level data on the 
Smart Meter Texas portal. Residential customers can share 
their account-level usage data with up to five friends, while 
business customers can manage access for other persons in their 
company.209 In line with PUCT rules, “Third-Party Service 
Providers” other than the customer’s retail service provider must 
be authorized via an Energy Data Agreement.210 Smart Meter 
Texas supports three agreements: (1) Energy Data Agreements, 
which provide twelve months of read-only access to the 
customer’s data; (2) In-Home Device Agreements, which allow 
the installation and connection of in-home devices with the 
customer’s smart meter; and (3) In-Home Device Services 
                                                        
 203. TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.107(b) (2018) (“All meter data, including all data 
generated, provided, or otherwise made available, by advanced meters and 
meter information networks, shall belong to a customer . . . .”). 
 204. 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 25.130(j)(5) (2018) (“A customer may authorize 
its data to be available to an entity other than its [retail electric provider].”). 
 205. See Frequently Asked Questions, SMART METER TEXAS, 
https://www.smartmetertexas.com/CAP/public/home/home_faq.html#a1 (last 
visited Mar. 23, 2019) (describing the general operations of Smart Meter Texas, 
a collaborative effort among AEP Texas Central Company, AEP Texas North 
Company, CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, Oncor Electric Delivery 
Company, and Texas-New Mexico Power Company). 
 206. See id. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See MURRAY & HAWLEY, supra note 67, at 18 (“Real-time data is 
available through the Home Area Network interface.”). 
 209. See SMART METER TEXAS, supra note 205. 
 210. See id. 
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Agreements, which authorize third parties to send messages and 
events over the customer’s home area network.211 
A general complaint about Smart Meter Texas is that its 
technology is outdated and “clunky,”212 so effectively using it 
incurs high transaction costs which makes it unappealing to 
most residential and business customers.213 To upgrade the 
centralized Smart Meter Texas platform to “SMT 2.0,” the PUCT 
engaged the Joint Transmission and Distribution Utilities 
operating Smart Meter Texas and Texas’ energy data 
stakeholders.214 The upgrades seeks to do two things: (1) 
streamline the authorization process from ten steps—five of 
which require the customer to affirmatively act—to a three step 
process; and (2) introduce the latest Green Button Connect 
application program interface.215 The PUCT approved the 
changes in May of 2018.216 
California, Illinois, and Texas have developed decentralized 
data management systems where the incumbent investor-owned 
utilities take primary responsibility over smart meter data. 
State public utility commissions then guide their access and 
                                                        
 211. See id. 
 212. See Jeff St. John, Texas Takes a Big Step in Improving Access to Smart 
Meter Data, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 6, 2018), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/texas-smart-meter-data-
access#gs.nm9DSRM (stating that the platform is “clunky” largely because it 
was “built on last decade’s technology, and cumbersome rules [] have dissuaded 
a vast majority” of households and business from taking part). 
 213. See KING & BEVILL, supra note 79, at 6–8 (stating that the consumers 
expect a certain level of simplicity and convenience of online services that the 
Smart Meter Texas program has not met). 
 214. See Michael Murray, Smart Meter Texas Goes Big: Settlement Calls for 
Green Button Connect API, MISSION: DATA (Feb. 2, 2018), 
http://www.missiondata.org/news/2018/2/2/smart-meter-texas-goes-big-
settlement-calls-for-green-button-connect-api. 
 215. See id. (discussing the three-step process and stating that SMT 2.0 will 
use the latest Green Button API). 
 216. Order, Commission Staff’s Petition to Determine Requirements for 
Smart Meter Texas, Docket No. 47472 (Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex. May 29, 2018), 
http://interchange.puc.texas.gov/Documents/47472_126_981735.pdf 
(subsequently modified by Order, Commission Staff’s Petition to Determine 
Requirements for Smart Meter Texas, Docket No. 47472 (Pub. Util. Comm’n of 
Tex. July 12, 2018), 
http://interchange.puc.texas.gov/Documents/47472_138_986459.PDF); see also 
R.A. Dyer, PUC Green Lights Smart Meter Texas 2.0, Expected Live in 2020, 
TEX. COALITION FOR AFFORDABLE POWER: POL’Y & REFORM BLOG (June 4, 
2018), https://tcaptx.com/policy-and-reform/blog-puc-green-lights-smart-meter-
texas-2-0-expected-in-2020d. 
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privacy decisions through tariffs and rulemaking regulations. 
The lack-of-access issues that persist under these decentralized 
models, and the recent European trend toward more centralized 
data management structures, indicate it is time for states to 
seriously consider the benefits of the centralized data hub model. 
II. ANALYSIS 
State energy data hubs offer a more efficient meter data 
management structure. Previous analysis of centralizing energy 
meter data highlighted the reduced burden on electric utilities 
to collect, aggregate, and release the data, the greater ability to 
police data disclosures, and the benefits of a central research 
unit with the necessary statistical expertise.217 A centralized 
data hub offers additional economic benefits that outweigh 
concerns over added bureaucratic costs. For one, a state data hub 
can prevent utilities from exercising inefficient market power 
over meter data access and privacy when it also participates in 
competitive energy services markets. Second, a centralized data 
hub may promote greater municipal and cooperative utility 
involvement, creating more comprehensive and representative 
datasets of state energy consumption. Finally, a politically 
accountable data hub better democratizes decisionmaking and 
enforcement of data disclosure and energy regulations, 
providing greater public control. 
U.S. state governments are no stranger to intervening in 
U.S. energy markets because they are prone to “market 
failures.”218 Emerging data markets similarly face significant 
market failures.219 It comes as no surprise, then, that smart 
meter data at the intersection of these two fields requires 
government correction. For example, energy usage data is at its 
core simply information about the flow of electrons into or out of 
a consumer’s home or business (or individual smart appliances 
                                                        
 217. See Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1150–57. 
 218. See, e.g., Anthony C. Fisher & Michael H. Rothkopf, Market Failure and 
Energy Policy, 17 ENERGY POL’Y 397, 398–404 (1989) (“When the ‘energy crisis’ 
of a decade ago forced economists and policymakers to take a hard look at the 
role of government, there was a sense that energy was special, that the 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics (market allocation is efficient) might 
not apply.”). 
 219. See, e.g., MARTIN PEITZ, CTR. ON REGULATION IN EUR., BIG DATA 
MARKETS (Mar. 28, 2018), 
https://www.cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/180328_CERRE_BigDataMarkets_ProfPe
itz_Slides.pdf. 
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communicating with the meter). That record is an “impure 
public good” or “club good,”220 meaning that while it is non-
rivalrous—two firms can simultaneously review and use the 
same smart meter dataset—the high cost of recording, 
transmitting, and storing smart meter data221 essentially allows 
the controlling firm to exclude others from accessing it.222 
To prevent the natural tendency of impure public goods 
resulting in inefficient natural monopolies, the government may 
create a publicly-regulated monopoly.223 That default solution 
underlies the California, Illinois, and Texas experiences—their 
state governments delegate data management decisions to the 
utility data-monopolists with the expectation that the utility 
company follows regulatory mandates regarding access and 
privacy. That traditional solution, represented by the fully 
decentralized utility-centric approach, fails to provide the most 
socially efficient balance between meter data access and privacy. 
Unfair market power, principal-agent, and coordination 
problems plague the decentralized model in ways that a 
centralized data hub model would reduce or remove—resulting 
in a better data access-privacy balance. 
A. THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT AND MARKET POWER PROBLEMS 
The decentralized, utility-based approach tempts private 
utilities to deviate from the socially-optimal access-privacy 
balance by exerting unfair market power.224 While government 
                                                        
 220. See James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA 
1 (1965). 
 221. See Soma Shekara Sreenadh Reddy Depuru et al., Smart Meters for 
Power Grid: Challenges, Issues, Advantages and Status, 15 RENEWABLE & 
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REVS. 2736, 2739–40 (2011) (describing how 
implementing AMI involves billions of investment dollars which makes it 
difficult to justify). 
 222. The high cost explains why smart meter deployment only occurs when 
an energy utility receives regulatory approval to recover rollout costs by 
increasing customer rates. See EDISON ELEC. INST., EEI SUMMARY OF STATE 
REGULATORY SMART GRID DECISIONS (2011), 
http://smartgrid.eei.org/Toolkit/2011-12-27-eei-state%20regulation-chart.pdf. 
The “controlling firm” becomes that regulatorily-privileged utility company. 
 223. Cf. Jeffery A. Dubin & Peter Navarro, How Markets for Impure Public 
Goods Organize: The Case of Household Refuse Collection, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
217, 217–18 (1988). 
 224. See Zachary Abrahamson, Essential Data, 124 YALE L.J. 867, 873–74 
(2014) (describing the private motivations for “data monopolists” to “refuse to 
deal” to ensure competing products and firms do not “supplant the monopolist’s 
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regulation can attempt to correct for market power, an agency 
problem often reduces the effects of regulatory efforts.225 With 
insights gained from smart meter data, many utilities will likely 
enter non-traditional energy services markets226 on its 
unregulated or “below-the-line” side of its business.227 To sustain 
a competitive edge over others in these markets, a utility with 
control over the necessary meter data might exploit poorly 
drafted regulations and rules.228 
An example would be a utility implementing overly 
restrictive security and technical requirements on third parties 
if given the right to “institute a process for the approval of third 
parties . . . if such requirements are related to data security, and 
the ability to receive the transmission of data in an efficient 
manner.”229 By increasing third party transaction costs to meet 
excessively high privacy requirements, the utility can overly 
                                                        
product”); cf. Craig Konnoth, Health Information Equity, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 
1317, 1330 (2017) (describing how recipients of health research data “are known 
for seeking to maintain data monopolies,” making it “harder to agglomerate 
private data”). 
 225. See Paul L. Joskow & Richard Schmalensee, Incentive Regulation for 
Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 16–18 (1986) (discussing the imperfect 
ability of regulators to monitor the regulated electric utilities); cf. JOSE MIGUEL 
ABITO, MEASURING THE WELFARE GAINS FROM OPTIMAL INCENTIVE 
REGULATION 2 (Nov. 24, 2017), https://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/07/abito_pollutionpriceregulation.pdf (discussing a 
corollary agency problem between regulators and energy utilities in the context 
of rate of return regulation). 
 226. See Herman K. Trabish, Time-Travel, Utility-Style: Outlines of the 
Utility of the Future Appear, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 5, 2018), 
https://www.utilitydive.com/news/time-travel-utility-style-outlines-of-the-
utility-of-the-future-appear/517788/; Justin Worland, Why Your Power 
Company Wants to Sell You More than Electricity, TIME (May 18, 2017), 
http://time.com/4783926/power-company-more-than-electricity/. 
 227. See Glossary of Terms Used by Utilities and Their Regulators, N.Y. 
STATE PUB. SERV. COMM’N http://www.dps.ny.gov/glossary.html#D (last 
updated Nov. 17, 2014) (defining “Below-the-Line” as “[a]ll income statement 
items of revenue and expense not included in determining utility net operating 
income.”). 
 228. See ABRAMS ENVTL. LAW CLINIC, supra note 69, at 32 (“[A]s the 
California model [nondisclosure agreement] and DOE’s Voluntary Code of 
Conduct demonstrate, even more specific rules can still leave some discretion to 
the regulated entities . . . .”). Previous experience with poor regulatory design 
in the electric industry illustrates the disconnect between social efficiency and 
the actual conduct motivated by private incentives. See Peter Bondarenko, 
Enron Scandal, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/Enron-
scandal (last updated Jan. 31, 2018). 
 229. CITIZENS UTIL. BD. & ENVTL. DEF. FUND, supra note 170, at 2. 
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restrict access to the available data and maintain a high barrier 
to entry in energy services markets.230 Monitoring and 
correcting this market power problem is likely to be expensive, 
and even with frequent reporting requirements, these reports 
may be read and interpreted on a delay—if at all.231 When 
inefficient market power is eventually found, it will require 
costly antitrust negotiations or litigation.232 
A centralized state energy data hub, on the other hand, 
would eliminate the utility’s private incentive to increase 
market entry barriers and replace it with the government’s 
public incentive to maintain competitive markets. Upfront data 
hub costs may result in long term cost reductions such as 
avoided monitoring efforts or reactive enforcement efforts 
because of poorly-crafted regulations. Energy consumers and the 
groups representing their interests can also monitor and correct 
an energy data hub’s management more effectively than the 
politically unaccountable utility management team (or, even 
worse, multiple unaccountable data managers for states with 
more than one energy utility). In short, a state energy data hub 
would better “democratize” energy meter data decisions by 
providing consumers with more competitive markets, greater 
meter data control, and a clearer path to intervention.233 
                                                        
 230. See LEE & ZAFAR, supra note 148 at 1–2 (“An ongoing concern is 
whether, and to what extent if any, the utilities act against the interests or 
wishes of the customer and erect barriers to limit the opportunity for authorized 
third parties to obtain customer usage information. An additional concern is 
whether the utility acts as barrier against the sharing of aggregated data with 
governmental organizations that are seeking data for research or operational 
purposes.”). 
 231. Cf. Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-
Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus 
Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U.L.Q. 329, 330 (2003) (“The Enron collapse 
demonstrates, however, that the ‘sunlight’ that disclosure brings about is useful 
only if market mechanisms are in place that are capable of observing and 
interpreting the information that the ‘sunlight’ brings into view.”). 
 232. See Jonathan M. Jacobson, Tackling the Time and Cost of Antitrust 
Litigation, 32 Antitrust 3 (2017). 
 233. See Shelley Welton, Grasping for Energy Democracy, 116 MICH. L. REV. 
581 (2018) (discussing the shift toward democratizing energy decisions to 
provide more consumer choice, exert greater local control, and achieve better 
access to process). 
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B. COORDINATION PROBLEMS 
Coordination problems occur when multiple firms lack 
sufficient communication methods to coordinate their activities 
toward a common interest.234 Here, coordination problems may 
cause utilities to fail to cooperate in creating complete, uniform, 
and state-wide databases. Without complete datasets, state 
benchmarkers, policy drafters, environmental interest 
organizations, and energy efficiency service providers looking at 
state-wide markets will lack necessary data to inform their 
activities. A smart meter data hub would provide three 
coordination benefits: (1) a standardized data platform and 
format; (2) the participation of cooperatives and municipal 
energy utilities outside public utility jurisdiction; and (3) 
consolidated data storage and processing facilities to maximize 
cost effectiveness. 
First, standardization serves a central role in coordinating 
meter data activities.235 Participation in energy data markets is 
less costly when the potential participant only needs to invest in 
a single software, particularly if one must pay multiple utilities 
for meter data access. Texas’ incumbent utilities created the 
Smart Meter Texas central web portal to standardize data 
aggregation and formatting for third parties.236 Similarly, the 
major electric utility providers in California, Illinois, and Texas 
voluntarily use the Green Button platform to standardize data 
collection and dissemination methods.237 A smart meter data 
hub would necessarily unify a state’s data format and software, 
accomplishing standardization by its very nature instead of 
relying on multiple utilities to voluntarily coordinate. 
Second, some U.S. states exclude cooperative and municipal 
electric utilities from public utility commission jurisdiction,238 
making their participation in a centralized energy data system 
                                                        
 234. The common interest has a higher payout for all firms involved, yet 
without commitments to coordinate most firms will choose lower-cost, lower-
payout actions. See Jack Ochs, Coordination Problems and Communication, in 
THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 1130, 1130–32 (Palgrave 
Macmillan ed., 2008). 
 235. Klass & Wilson, supra note 8, at 1152 (“Programs to identify energy 
efficiency opportunities, whether private or municipal, will require 
standardized data inputs to be developed at scale.”). 
 236. See supra notes 205–216 and accompanying text. 
 237. See supra notes 129–133 and accompanying text. 
 238. Compare MINN. STAT. § 216B.02, subd. 4 (2018), and ILL. COMP. STAT. 
act 5 § 3-105 (2018), with CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 216 (2018). 
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less likely. Negotiating data-sharing agreements with each 
public utility would likely outweigh any privately-profitable 
insights these alternative utilities might gain from data outside 
their service territories.239 If left to private piecemeal 
transacting under the decentralized model, the nonparticipation 
of municipal and cooperative utilities would leave significant 
gaps in a state’s energy meter datasets as municipal and 
cooperative service territories can cover large portions of a 
state.240 This would isolate municipal and cooperative energy 
customers from beneficial insights and energy services, as well 
as increase transaction costs for academic researchers and state 
regulators with limited budgets. Centralizing meter data would 
present municipalities and cooperatives with a single party to 
negotiate with, on nondiscriminatory grounds, significantly 
reducing transaction costs for creating a complete and 
representative state energy consumption profile. 
Finally, a smart meter data hub would consolidate the costs 
of establishing and maintaining a data facility. Under a 
decentralized model, each utility must build and service secure 
data centers for its customers’ smart meter data. Centralization 
coordinates these efforts into a single process that will reduce 
energy and real estate costs,241 as well as reduce the burden 
public utilities would otherwise pass down to their ratepayers. A 
centralized data hub additionally increases a state’s overall 
                                                        
 239. That’s not to say that the total social benefits wouldn’t outweigh these 
costs. Researchers and service providers with state-wide scopes would benefit 
from data profiles that included municipal and cooperative service territories, 
but the problem is the utilities would not privately capture those benefits or add 
them to its own cost-benefit analysis. 
 240. Colorado’s state constitution, for example, exempts municipally owned 
utilities from public utility commission jurisdiction, exempting about seventeen 
percent of the state’s electricity consumers from the commission’s authority. See 
COLO. CONST. art. 25 (added Nov. 2, 1954); About Public Power, COLO. ASS’N OF 
MUNICIPAL UTILS., http://www.coloradopublicpower.org/about (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2019). 
 241. Cf. Grant Gross, This Wave of Data Center Consolidation Is Different 
from the First One, DATA CTR. KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 8, 2018), 
http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/manage/wave-data-center-consolidation-
different-first-one; Bob Violino, How Data Centers can be Energy Efficient, High 
Performing and Secure, BITDEFENDER (Mar. 15, 2016), 
https://businessinsights.bitdefender.com/data-centers-optimization-energy-
efficient-performing-secure (explaining the federal government’s Data Center 
Optimization Initiative aims to “consolidate inefficient infrastructure, optimize 
existing facilities, achieve cost savings, and transition to more efficient 
infrastructure, such as cloud services and inter-agency shared services.”). 
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energy efficiency by powering and cooling the servers at scale.242 
Lastly, removing facility construction and operation 
responsibilities away from the utilities also reduces their 
perverse incentive to recover more by over-investing capital on 
such facilities.243 Reduced costs, improved energy efficiency, 
uniformity, and more complete state data profiles illustrate the 
additional coordination achieved by the state energy data hub 
model. 
C. PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEMS IN DATA PRIVACY 
A smart meter data hub provides efficient privacy 
protections against data breaches and unapproved uses of 
energy data. Centralized privacy protection benefits energy 
consumers better than the decentralized, utility-centric 
approach in two ways. First, centralization aligns privacy 
regulations with actual implementation in a more cost-effective 
manner. Second, a centralized data hub can better align 
enforcement decisions under privacy protection mechanisms like 
contracts with the public’s privacy interests. 
Privacy values and implementation decisions differ between 
federal agencies because of the “principal-agent problems 
inherent in administrative delegation.”244 A decentralized data 
management structure would likely result in the similar 
disparate treatment of energy customers’ privacy rights. For 
one, public utility companies are less responsive to poor public 
relations that otherwise motivate most private, data-collecting 
firms to make optimal customer privacy protection decisions.245 
                                                        
 242. See Economies of Scale Impact Data Center Costs, FACILITY EXECUTIVE 
(Aug. 23, 2016), https://facilityexecutive.com/2016/08/economies-of-scale-
impact-data-center-costs/ (citing PONEMON INST., COST TO SUPPORT COMPUTE 
CAPACITY (2016)). 
 243. See Herman K. Trabish, Tackling the Perverse Incentive: Utilities Need 
New Cost Recovery Mechanisms for New Technologies, UTIL. DIVE (Mar. 6, 
2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/tackling-the-perverse-incentive-
utilities-need-new-cost-recovery-mechanism/518320/. 
 244. Kenneth A. Bamberger & Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy Decisionmaking 
in Administrative Agencies, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 75, 83 (2008). 
 245. See ALESSANDRO ACQUISTI, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
THE ECONOMICS OF PERSONAL DATA AND THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY 21 (2010) 
(“Consumers may also punish firms that they perceive as not adequately 
protective of their data indirectly. A Ponemon Institute survey suggests that 
about one consumer out of five terminated their relationships with a company 
that compromised their data.”) (citation omitted). One recent example is the 
adverse effect on Facebook’s stock and the #deletefacebook movement following 
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Public utilities enjoy set service territories and a monopoly over 
a particular electricity service for captured customers within 
those boundaries.246 Customers displeased with their utility 
company’s meter data protection cannot simply change 
electricity providers (at least in traditionally regulated states). 
The inability of energy customers to switch to another a public 
utility’s services—whether retail electricity in traditionally 
structured states or distribution services in restructured 
states—insulates many utilities from the full brunt of public 
retaliation, which reduces their private incentive to expend 
resources on preventing unauthorized disclosures or misuses of 
energy data. Politically accountable officials in a state data hub, 
however, would be more sensitive to potential breaches and 
better align public privacy expectations with actual privacy 
protection efforts. 
One manifestation of the data hub’s improved privacy 
protection incentive is more proactive implementation and 
enforcement. A concern with simply regulating a private utility’s 
data privacy conduct is that “[r]egulatory compliance often 
comes in after the data breaches have happened.”247 Again, 
effective monitoring can be expensive and difficult to 
maintain.248 If compliance costs and penalties for noncompliance 
are high, the utility may act overly-cautious and offer 
suboptimal access to its customers’ meter data. Multiple utilities 
in one state multiplies these monitoring and compliance costs, 
raising the social cost of achieving an optimal access-privacy 
balance. Instead, it is likely less costly and more uniformly 
applied across every utility’s customers if handled by the 
regulators themselves. The centralized data hub offers a cost-
effective opportunity to proactively and uniformly protect energy 
data privacy. 
                                                        
the Cambridge Analytica revelations. See Ben Popken, Facebook Stock Takes 
Hit on FTC Probe and News It Records Users’ Call Logs, NBC NEWS (last 
updated Mar. 26, 2018, 12:10 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-
media/facebook-confirms-it-records-call-history-stoking-privacy-furor-n860006. 
 246. This statement applies to both traditionally-regulated and restructured 
states since it is the incumbent utilities, rather than the competitive retail 
electricity providers, acting as the data holders. See, e.g., DYER, supra note 195, 
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 247. Dancey Balough, supra note 25, at 185 (quoting Ontario’s Privacy 
Commissioner Urges Halting Smart Grid, SMARTGRIDTODAY (Apr. 8, 2010), 
http://www.smartgridtoday.com/public/1447.cfm? sd=31). 
 248. See Macey, supra note 231, at 330. 
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Uniformity and responsiveness to public privacy concerns 
can also be increased when a central hub directly controls 
privacy protection mechanisms, such as disclosure contracts. 
Contractually obligating data recipients can effectively define 
the scope of energy data uses based on the characteristics of the 
recipient, allocate liability to recipients to encourage greater 
privacy protection efforts on their end, and better democratize 
litigation decisions or compel corrective actions in the event of 
data breaches.249 The Family Educational Rights and Privacy 
Act, for example, requires recipients of personally identifying 
education data to enter written agreements with provisions 
requiring destruction of data once the recipient no longer needs 
it.250 Another useful contractual obligation is found in 
California’s Student Online Personal Information Protection Act 
which prohibits use of disclosed data beyond the scope of the 
contracted purpose.251 
Regulation might require a utility in a decentralized 
structure to include such terms, but the regulations “teeth” may 
be diluted by the utility’s decisions on whether to enforce them. 
Here again, any misalignment between a utility’s private 
interests and the overall public interest may result in 
suboptimal resources being expended on remedial actions for 
breaches or misuses. The centralized data hub approach 
provides superior enforcement discretion because it can utilize 
experienced legal resources like state consumer protection units. 
A centralized government data manager could also provide a 
clearer path to relief for harmed data subjects, both by being a 
party to the contract with power to enforce it and by explicitly 
allowing private rights of action under state administrative 
procedure acts to review non-enforcement decisions. Finally, 
economic analysis has shown governments provide more 
efficient consumer protection litigation decisions because they 
internalize the full benefits of legal precedent.252 The greater 
                                                        
 249. See ABRAMS ENVTL. LAW CLINIC, supra note 69, at 2, 40–42, 67–70 
(identifying various contractual approaches under current structures and 
describing how pre-disclosure contract provisions can “assign liabilities for 
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resources and better aligned incentives of government-based 
enforcement suggest the state data hub model supplies greater 
privacy protection. 
D. GOVERNMENT CONTROL AND BUREAUCRACY 
The main complaints against smart meter data hubs are: (1) 
they require large administrative and bureaucratic costs;253 and 
(2) that consumers are weary of government access to personally 
identifying data.254 The cost of an added bureaucracy, however, 
is likely less than the avoided costs of suboptimal access, 
uncoordinated efforts, or multiple regulatory compliance 
monitoring programs that result from the government 
regulating from the sidelines. The agency problems inherent in 
delegating access and privacy protection decisions create social 
costs external to an energy utility’s ledger. A more sophisticated 
calculation of actual costs and benefits of centralizing data 
management is warranted and should not be easily dispelled 
based on nebulous claims of extra bureaucracy alone. 
State policymakers remain cognizant of significant public 
skepticism toward public and private institutions’ ability to 
safely handle personally identifiable information.255 As for 
mistrust of government access to private energy consumption 
data, the concerns are likely overgeneralized and overstated.256 
In the wake of major data breaches against private corporations 
like Facebook, Equifax, and Yahoo,257 the difference between 
government management and private management of 
personally identifying data is likely minimal. It is at least 
ambiguous whether the government or private companies 
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 254. See Duarte, supra note 93, at 1156–60; McNeil, supra note 93, at 205. 
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 257. See Smith, supra note 255. 
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deserve the least public trust as managers of private data.258 In 
light of this ambiguity, the greater democratization of data 
privacy achieved by a centralized smart meter data hubs cuts in 
favor of picking this lesser of two evils.259 
III. CONCLUSION 
Electricity metering is evolving. AMI allows grid operators 
to interact with consumers and their electricity-consuming 
things in real-time. It also creates a detailed record of 
consumption data that presents a myriad of potential 
applications. If properly managed, this data will benefit 
stakeholders along the electricity supply chain. The 
predominant decentralized, utility-based management approach 
underperforms at this critical data management, however. 
Instead, centralizing these data management responsibilities in 
state energy data hubs would likely improve data accessibility, 
completeness, and privacy. 
Centralized state data management reduces transactional 
burdens on electric utilities, improves the policing of data 
disclosures, and would better democratize policy decisions. The 
smart meter data hub also reduces the social costs of agency 
problems that cause inefficient market power imbalances and 
suboptimal regulation implementation. Centralizing data 
management could also provide for better cooperation and 
coordination of consumption data collection, storage, and 
dissemination. These reduced social costs outweigh any added 
bureaucracy and warrant greater discussion of the role for state 
energy data hubs in facilitating the future promised by smart 
meters. 
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